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Let us send a signal out to the world that the days of undereducating our 
young people, the days of underestimating our young people are over. 
    --Hugh Price, President of the National Urban League, 
    quoted in Education Week., July 14, 19991 
 
 
I. THE PROBLEM 
 Educational reformers and most of the American public believe that most teachers ask 
too little of their pupils.  These low expectations, they believe, result in watered down curricula 
and a tolerance of mediocre teaching and inappropriate student behavior.  The result is that the 
prophecy of low achievement becomes self-fulfilling.  
 Although research has shown that learning gains are substantially larger when students 
take more demanding courses2, only a minority of students enroll in these courses. There are 
several reasons for this. Guidance counselors in many schools allow only a select few into the 
most challenging courses.  While most schools give students and parents the authority to 
overturn counselor recommendations, many families are unaware they have that power or are 
intimidated by the counselor’s prediction of failure in the tougher class. As one student put it: 
“African-American parents, they settle for less, not knowing they can get more for their 
students.” 3 
 In part the problem is ignorance.  Students appear to be unaware of just how important 
courses like algebra and geometry are for getting into and completing college. Even though 80 
percent of 10th graders in 1988 expected to go to college, and 53 percent aspired to a 
professional or technical job, only 20 percent of 8th graders in 1989 thought they would need 
geometry and only 24 percent said they would need algebra “to qualify for [their] first choice job.” 
4    
 A second source of the problem is that most students prefer courses that have the 
reputation of being fun and not requiring much work to get a good grade.  In the 1987 survey, 62 
percent of 10th graders agreed with the statement, "I don't like to do any more school work 
than I have to." 5    Many parents support their children’s preference for easier courses. Even in 
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wealthy communities, they often demand that their child switch to easier courses where good 
grades are easier to get.  As one guidance counselor described: 
A lot of... parents were in a ‘feel good’ mode. “If my kids are not happy, I’m 
not happy.” …Probably…25 percent …were going for top colleges.  They 
were pushing their kids hard.  The rest---75 percent (I’m guessing at the 
numbers)---said “No, that’s too hard, they don’t have to do that.”…If they [ 
the students] felt it was too tough, they would back off.  I had to hold people 
in classes, hold the parents back.  [I would say] “Let the kid get C’s.  It’s OK. 
Then they’ll get C+’s and then B’s.”  [But they would demand,] “No! I want 
my kid out of that class!” 6 
Teachers are aware of student preferences and adjust their style of teaching and their 
homework assignments with an eye to maintaining enrollment levels.  Guidance counselors, 
students and parents avoid rigorous courses largely because the rewards for the extra work are 
small for most students. While selective colleges evaluate grades in the light of course 
demands, many colleges have, historically, not factored the rigor of high school courses into 
their admissions decisions.  Trying to counteract this problem, college admissions officers have 
been telling students that they are expected to take the most rigorous courses offered by their 
school.  This effort has been partly successful.  More students are taking chemistry and physics 
and advanced mathematics.  But apparently many students have not gotten the message and 
still think taking easy courses is a good strategy.   One student told a reporter:  
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while.  But 
it was pretty hard and the teacher moved fast.  I switched to the other 
history and I'm getting better grades.  So my average will be better for 
college.  Unless you are going to a college in the state, it doesn't really 
matter whether you get a Regent's diploma.7  
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 Consequently, the bulk of students who do not aspire to attend selective colleges quite rationally 
avoid rigorous courses and demanding teachers.  
 When teachers try to set high standards, they often get pressured to go easy.  The 
following story is from southern Texas in the early 1980s.   
“In the first grading period I boldly flunked a number of students, including 
the daughter of an administrator of a local elementary school and a star 
fullback who was also the nephew of a school board member.  Shortly 
thereafter I was called in to meet with my principal and the aggrieved 
parents.  Such was my naivete that I actually bothered to bring evidence. I 
showed the elementary administrator her daughter’s plagiarized book 
report and the book from which it had been copied, and I showed the 
fullback’s father homework bearing his son’s name but written in another 
person’s hand writing.  The parents offered weak apologies but maintained 
that I had not treated their children fairly.  
 My principal suddenly discovered a number of problems with my 
teaching.  For the next few weeks he was in my class almost daily.  Every 
spitball, every chattering student, every bit of graffiti was noted. When 
there were discipline problems my superiors sided with the offending 
students. Teaching became impossible. 
 So I learned to turn a blind eye to cheating and plagiarism and to 
give students, especially athletes, extra credit for everything from reading 
orally in class to remembering to bring their pencils.  In this way I gained 
the cooperation of my students and the respect and support of my 
superiors.”8 
This story is not an isolated example. Thirty percent of American teachers say they "feel 
pressure to give higher grades than students' work deserves."  Thirty percent also feel 
pressured "to reduce the difficulty and amount of work you assign."9  
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Nerd Harassment   
 Interviews I conducted of middle school boys in Ithaca New York in 1996 and 1997 
revealed that most of them internalized a norm against “sucking up” to the teacher.   How does a 
boy avoid being thought a “Suck up?”   He:  
· Avoids giving the teacher eye contact 
· Does not hand in homework early for extra credit, 
· Does not raise his hand in class too frequently, and 
· Talks or passes notes to friends during class (this signals that you value friends more 
than  your rep with the teacher).  
Similarly, Steinberg, Brown and Dornbusch’s recent study of nine high schools in California and 
Wisconsin concluded that: 
 ...less than 5 percent of all students are members of a high-achieving crowd that 
defines itself mainly on the basis of academic excellence...  Of all the crowds the 
‘brains’ were the least happy with who they are--nearly half wished they were in a 
different crowd.10  
 Why are the studious called suck ups, dorks and nerds or accused of “acting white”?  
In part, it is because many teachers grade on a curve and this means trying hard to do well in a 
class is making it more difficult for others to get top grades.  When exams are graded on a curve 
or college admissions are based on rank in class, joint welfare is maximized if no one puts in 
extra effort.  In the repeated game that results, side payments--friendship and respect--and 
punishments—ridicule, harassment and ostracism--enforce the cooperative "don't study much" 
solution.  If, by contrast, students are evaluated relative to an outside standard, they no longer 
have a personal interest in getting teachers off track or persuading each other to refrain from 
studying.  Peer pressure demeaning studiousness should diminish. 
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Teacher Quality and Out-of-Field Teaching 
 The standards for getting into secondary school teaching are quite low.  Most states 
using the National Teachers Examination/Praxis test have set remarkably low minimum passing 
scores.11  Despite the low cut scores, failing these tests is not an absolute bar to entering the 
profession.  Principals routinely fill open positions with uncertified teachers.  School 
administrators are also remarkably willing to hire and assign staff to teach subjects that are 
outside their field of expertise and training.  More than half of secondary school history classes 
are taught by teachers who neither majored nor minored in history in college.  More than half of 
chemistry and physics students are taught by teachers who did not major or minor in a physical 
science or engineering in college.12  
The Signals Sent by the Labor Market 
  Employers also have an important role in encouraging higher academic standards.  
American employers, however, have a difficult time getting information on student achievement 
in school so they seldom consider the rigor of high school courses or externally assessed 
student achievement when making hiring decisions.  If a student or graduate has given written 
permission for a transcript to be sent to an employer, the Federal Education Rights and Privacy 
Act obligates the school to respond.  Many high schools are not, however, responding to such 
requests.  In Columbus Ohio, for example, Nationwide Insurance sent over 1,200 requests for 
transcripts signed by job applicants to high schools in 1982 and received only 93 responses.  An 
additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts in selecting new employees is that when 
high schools do respond, it takes a great deal of time.  In most high schools, the system for 
responding to transcript requests has been designed to meet the needs of college-bound 
students rather than the students who seek jobs immediately after graduating.  The result is that 
a 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small-and medium-sized employers who were 
members of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) found that transcripts had 
been obtained prior to the selection decision for only 14.2 percent of the high school graduates 
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hired.13 Only 15 percent of the employers had asked high school graduates to report their grade 
point average.  The absence of questions about grades on most job application forms probably 
reflects the low reliability of self reported data, the difficulties of verifying them, and the fear of 
EEO challenges to such questions.14 Tests are available for measuring competency in reading, 
writing, mathematics, science, and problem solving; but, after the 1971 Griggs decision, almost 
all firms were forced to stop employment testing by EEOC guidelines that made it prohibitively 
costly to demonstrate test validity.15  The 1987 NFIB survey found that basic skills tests had 
been given in only 2.9 percent of the hiring decisions studied. 
These problems in signaling student achievement to employers are probably important 
reasons why tests assessing these skills have only modest effects on the wages and earnings 
of men and women under the age of 25.16  Over time, however, employers learn which 
employees are the most competent by observing job performance.  Those judged most 
competent are more likely to get further training, promotions and good recommendations when 
they move on.  Poor performers are encouraged to leave.  Since academic achievement in high 
school is correlated with job performance,17 the sorting process results in basic skills assessed 
during high school having a much larger effect on the labor market success of 30 year olds than 
of 19 year olds even when contemporaneous measures of completed schooling are held 
constant.18 
Altonji and Pierret’s study of how scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
taken while a teenager effect subsequent labor market success provides estimates of the 
magnitude of these effects in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Controlling for a 
contemporaneous measure of completed schooling, they found that a one standard deviation (4-
5 grade level equivalent) higher AFQT score was associated with only a 2.8 percent increase in 
wage rates the first year out of school but a 16 percent increase 11 years later.19  By contrast, 
the percentage impact of a year of schooling decreased with time out of school from 9.2 percent 
for those out just one year to 3 percent for those out for 12 years.   
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 The long delays before the benefits of academic achievement in high school start 
accruing can send students the wrong signals.  Teenagers are very aware that getting a college 
degree will yield substantial benefits.  They can see in their community and on TV that college 
educated adults have good jobs and live in large attractive houses.  
 How by contrast do youngsters assess the rewards for taking tough courses and 
studying hard in high school? Those who aspire to attend competitive colleges realize they have 
to work hard in high school.  But most students plan to attend the local state college or 
community college not a competitive state university or a selective private college.  Their own 
experience tells them that this objective can be achieved without taking tough courses or working 
hard.20 They do not know whether the successful adults they see in their community took 
rigorous courses and studied hard in high school.  They may, however, know more about older 
siblings and other recent graduates. What lessons would they draw from observing their 
success in the labor market?   As we saw above they will observe almost no relationship 
between academic achievement of their older siblings/friends and the quality of their jobs.  So it 
would be reasonable for youngsters to conclude that while credentials are rewarded by 
employers, learning is not.  If that is the conclusion they draw, the best strategy for the bulk of 
students is to study just hard enough to get the diploma and be admitted to college, but no 
harder.   One student put it succinctly: “Why should I do the extra work, if I don’t have to.”21 
II. POLICY RESPONSES TO LOW STANDARDS AND STUDENT’S “DOING THE 
MINIMUM” 
 State level political and educational leaders have been concerned about the low 
standards and weak incentives for hard study for decades. The traditional policy instruments—
budgetary support for schools and school construction, teacher certification rules, etc.—did not 
address learning standards, so other instruments were sought.  Five different strategies have 
been pursued.  
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1. Increased Graduation Requirements:  During the past two decades many states 
have increased the number of core academic courses students must take to graduate.  This has 
increased enrollment in college preparatory mathematics and science classes, but it can not 
assure that these courses are challenging or that students work up to their potential.  It may also 
have the unintended consequence of inducing some students to drop out of high school 
altogether.  The next four strategies will be collectively referred to as Standards-Based Reform 
strategies.  
2. Achievement Tests, School Report Cards and Stakes for Teachers and 
Administrators:  Another approach has been to develop content standards for required core 
academic courses, administer tests assessing that content to all students across the entire 
state and then publish the results--district by district and school by school.  Thirty-seven states 
now publish school report cards for all or almost all of their schools.22  The hope is that publicly 
identifying low performing schools will spur administrators and school boards to take remedial 
action.  Nineteen states have special assistance programs to help failing schools turn 
themselves around.  If improvements are not forthcoming, eleven states have the power to either 
close down, take over or reconstitute failing schools.  Positive reinforcements are also being 
tried.  Nineteen states have a formal mechanism for rewarding schools either for year-to-year 
gains in achievement test scores or for exceeding student achievement targets.23 
3. Minimum Competency Exam Graduation Requirements:  A growing number of 
states are applying stakes to students as well as to teachers.  In 1996, seventeen states and a 
number of urban districts were awarding high school diplomas only to students who had passed 
a minimum competency exam.  Table 1 presents 1980-82 and 1992 data from a survey of 
principals on the proportion of high school students who faced such a requirement.  MCE 
graduation requirements were occasionally introduced by school districts, but in most cases by 
state legislatures, often in response to a popular perception that the state’s K-12 education 
system had failed. Generally speaking it has been southern states and states with large urban 
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populations that have established MCEs.  That is why students from low socio-economic 
backgrounds and students with low test scores are more likely to attend schools with MCEs. 
Table 1: 
High Schools Requiring Passage of a Minimum Competency Exam to Graduate: 
Proportion of Seniors Who Attend 
 
Socio-Economic Status 
  
Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 1980-2 .560 .503 .487  
 1992 .647 .557 .442  
 
Reading & Math Scores 
  
Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
       1980-2 .547 .515 .466  
 1992 .643 .565 .457  
Source:  Tabulations of HSB and NELS-88 principal survey responses weighted by the number of students 
sampled at the high school.  Both surveys over sampled schools with large minority populations. 
 
 MCEs raise standards, but not for everyone.24  The standards set by the teachers of 
honors classes and advanced college prep classes are not changed by an MCE.  Students in 
these classes pass the MCE on the first try without special preparation.  Often high school 
transcripts report only who has passed the MCE, not how far above the passing standard the 
student got.   The higher standards are experienced by the students who are in the school’s 
least challenging courses.  Students pursuing the “Do the Minimum” strategy are told “you must 
work harder” if you are to get the diploma and go to college.  School administrators will not want 
to be embarrassed by high failure rates, so they are likely to focus additional energy and 
resources on raising standards in the early grades and improving the instruction received by 
struggling students.  In most states science, history and civics/government are not covered by 
the MCE, so their impact on achievement in these subjects is indirect.  Presumably they raise 
achievement in reading, writing and mathematics and this then helps students do better in 
history and science classes and on tests covering these subjects.   
 MCEs typically set a pretty low minimum standard.  In 1996 only 4 of the 17 states with 
MCEs targeted their graduation exams at a 10th grade proficiency level or higher.  Failure rates 
for students taking the test for the first time varied a great deal: from a high of 46% in Texas, 34 
% in Virginia, 30% in Tennessee and 27% in New Jersey to a low of 7% for Mississippi.  
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However, since students can take the tests multiple times, eventual pass rates for the Class of 
1995 were much higher: 98% in Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Ohio; 96 % 
in Nevada and New Jersey, 91% in Texas and 83% in Georgia. 25  Since the tests are designed 
to determine who falls below a pretty low standard, they typically do not assess material that 
college bound students study in 10th and 11th grade (e.g. Algebra II and geometry proofs).   
 4. Voluntary End-of-Course Examinations—Advanced Placement and End-of 
Course Exams in New York, North Carolina and California:  End-of-Course Exams 
(EOCEs) are different from MCEs in that they typically assess more difficult material and are 
taken by students nearing the end of a specific course or sequence of courses—e.g. Biology, 
French, American History or Calculus.26   They are very much like the final exams that teachers 
give at the end of the year.  Teachers are inevitably viewed as responsible, at least in part, for 
how well their class does on the exam.  EOCEs signal the student’s achievement level in the 
subject, not just whether the student exceeds or falls below a specific cut point that all high 
school graduates are required to surpass.   Consequently all students, not just those at the 
bottom of the class, have an incentive to study hard to do well on the exam and, consequently, 
an EOCE is more likely to improve classroom culture than a MCE.27  The consequence or 
stakes tend to be different, as well.   For voluntary EOCEs, the stakes are typically getting an A 
rather than a B in a course or getting college credit for a high school course.  For MCEs, the 
stakes are getting a high school diploma.  To summarize, compared to MCEs, the standards are 
higher with voluntary EOCEs and the stakes are lower but they apply pretty much equally to all 
students in a particular class, though sometimes not to all students in a school. 
 Advanced Placement Courses and Exams: The number of students taking Advanced 
Placement (AP) examinations has been growing at a compound annual rate of 9 percent per 
year.  In 1999 686,000 students, about 11 percent of the nation’s juniors and seniors, took one or 
more AP exams.28  Despite this success, however, 44 percent of the high schools do not offer 
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even one AP course and many others allow only a tiny minority of their students to take these 
courses.  
  North Carolina End-of-Course Tests:  The Elementary and Secondary Reform Act of 
1994 authorized the State Department of Education to develop end-of-course tests for ten core 
high school subjects.  EOC tests were introduced for Algebra 1 and 2, Geometry, Biology, 
Chemistry, Physics, Physical Science, US History, Social Science and English 1 between 1988 
and 1991.  Except for a four year interlude in which some tests were made a local option, all 
students taking these courses were required to take the state tests.  Easier versions of these 
courses not assessed by a state test do not exist, so virtually all North Carolina high school 
students take at least six of these exams.  Test scores are reported separately on the student’s 
transcript.  Most teachers have been incorporating EOC exam scores into their course grades 
and a state law now mandates that, starting in the year 2000, the EOCE test scores must have 
at least a 25% weight in the final course grade.  
  California’s Golden States Exams: California introduced voluntary EOCEs in Algebra I 
and Geometry in 1987, U.S. History and Economics in 1990, Biology and Chemistry in 1991, 
Written Composition in 1996, Government in 1997, Reading/Literature in 1998 and Physics and 
Spanish in 1999.  By 1993 about 31 percent of California high school students were taking the 
Algebra exam, 20 percent were taking the geometry exam and 14 percent were taking the U.S. 
History and Biology exams.29  Outstanding achievement on each exam is recognized by the 
state and appears on the student’s transcript but is not part of the grade that the student 
receives from her teacher.  Students who earn high honors, honors or recognition designations 
on 6 Golden State Exams (GSEs) get a special Golden State Diploma from the state.  In 1998 
about one percent of the states graduates received such a designation.  
 Regents Courses and Exams:  Begun in the 1860s, New York State’s curriculum-
based Regents Examination System is the oldest American example of end–of-course 
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examinations. Sherman Tinkelman, Assistant Commissioner for Examinations and Scholarships 
described the system in a 1966 report:  
 The Regents examinations are closely related to the curriculum in New York 
State.  They are, as you can see, inseparably intertwined..... These instruments 
presuppose and define standards.... They are a strong supervisory and 
instructional tool--and deliberately so.  They are effective in stimulating good 
teaching and good learning practices.30  
They are taken throughout one’s high school career.  A college bound student taking a full 
schedule of Regents courses would typically take Regents exams in mathematics and earth 
science at the end of 9th grade; mathematics, biology and global studies exams at the end of 
10th grade; mathematics, chemistry, American history, English and foreign language exams at 
the end of 11th grade and a physics exam at the end of 12th grade.  To accommodate summer 
school students and courses ending in January, the exams are given three times a year.   
 These external exams have substantial effects on teachers.  Since they grade the 
Regents exams of the students in their own classes, they can see the kinds of mistakes their 
students are making and use that information to improve their coverage of the material the 
following year.  Essays are generally graded by more than one teacher and this results in 
feedback and discussions among colleagues that are an excellent professional development 
experience for most participants.  The exams also provide a benchmark against which the 
teacher, her departmental colleagues and administrators may judge teaching effectiveness.  On 
occasions, examinations have been deliberately revised to induce changes in curriculum and 
teaching. 
For years our foreign language specialists went up and down the State beating 
the drums for curriculum reform in modern language teaching, for change in 
emphasis from formal grammar to conversation skills and reading skills.  There 
was not very great impact until we introduced, after notice and with numerous 
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sample exercises, oral comprehension and reading comprehension into our 
Regents examinations.  Promptly thereafter, most schools adopted the new 
curricular objectives.31 
Publication of school level results puts administrators under pressure to hire teachers who have 
deep knowledge of their subject and to introduce whole school reform programs that upgrade 
instruction in the early grades. 
 For students the stakes attached to Regents exams were pretty low.  Each district 
decides whether Regents exam grades are to be a part of the course grade and how much 
weight to assign to them.  While almost all districts count Regents exam results as a final exam 
grade, teachers or departments generally give their own final as well so when grades on finals 
are averaged in with quarterly marking period grades Regents exam scores seldom account for 
more than an eighth of the student’s final grade in a course.  Eligibility for a “Regents” as 
opposed to a local diploma depends on passing the Regents exams but the benefits of getting a 
“Regents” diploma are small. While Regents exam grades appear on high school transcripts, 
college admissions decisions depend on grades and SAT scores, not Regents exam scores or 
Regents diplomas.32  Many students saw an advantage in taking easier “local” classes to 
enhance their GPA's.  
 AP and Regents exams raise standards through a variety of mechanisms.  First, in the 
classes in which they are used, they push up teaching standards and help motivate students to 
study and to cooperate with each other.  Students are no longer competing for a limited number 
of As and Bs.  Now it is possible for everyone in the class to be recognized for excellence in the 
subject.  Secondly, the external exam creates a signal of competence that colleges use in 
making admissions and placement decisions and this increases the rewards for learning and 
makes them more visible and immediate.  This also increases student motivation.  Thirdly, the 
honors and college credits that are awarded to those who demonstrate and signal their 
achievement attract students into the more challenging and demanding courses that prepare 
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them for these examinations. In many districts, this effect operates as far back as sixth grade 
where decisions about whether to accelerate in mathematics effectively determine whether a 
student can take AP calculus in his senior year.  Fourthly, the share of students taking the 
externally examined courses and the results of those exams effect the community’s perception 
of school quality and of the performance of the school district’s teachers and administrators.  
Property values respond to these perceptions.  School administrators will thus face strong 
incentives to focus on the school’s core academic mission.   
 The power of these incentives depends, of course, on the share of students taking 
externally examined courses.  Unfortunately, during the 1980s and early 1990s many students 
were not taking Regents courses and exams.  In 1992 the most popular exam, Course I 
Mathematics, was taken by 62 percent of students, the Global Studies exam was taken by 57 
percent of students and the English and Biology exams were taken by 50 percent of students.   
Only 38 percent of graduates earned Regent’s diplomas signifying completion of a sequence of 
Regents courses in 1992/3.33  New York State dealt with this problem by creating and expanding 
a system of Regents Competency Tests (RCTs) in reading, writing, math, science, global 
studies and U.S. history that set a minimum standard for those not taking Regents courses. 
 5.   Compulsory End-of-Course Examinations: The RCTs were pretty low level tests, 
however.  The mathematics RCT, for example, assumed no exposure to algebra or geometry. 
Concern grew that large numbers of students particularly in New York City were wasting their 
time in watered down courses.  Ramon Cortines, Chancellor of New York City School System, 
for example, declared: 
The easy way out is the road to nowhere.  If achievement in our schools is 
to improve, we must raise our expectations for students and staff.  Our 
system will fail in its obligation to this community unless we equalize 
educational opportunity and raise standards in all of our schools.34 
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Under Cortines leadership the New York City Board of Education decided that starting with those 
entering 9th grade in the fall of 1994, all students would have to take 3 Regents level math and 3 
Regents level science courses before graduating.  With this step, New York City was abolishing 
the bottom track.  Students were taught much more demanding material, but they did not have to 
pass the Regents exams to get credit for the course.  That was their teacher’s decision.   
  Two years later the State Board of Regents decided to raise the bar for the entire state.  
Students would not only be required to take Regents level courses, they would have to pass the 
Regents exams for these courses.  Specifically, students entering 9th grade in 1996 or later were 
required to take a new six hour Regents English examination and pass it at the 55% level.  The 
class of 2001 has the additional requirement of passing an examination in algebra and geometry.  
The class of 2002 must also pass Regents examinations in global studies and American history 
as well.  When laboratory science exams come on stream, the phase in of all five new required 
Regents exams will be completed with the graduating class of 2003.  While passing cut scores 
were lowered by 10 points, the content of the exams was not watered down.35  The one-half of 
New York students who had been getting through high school taking unchallenging local courses 
will now be forced to demonstrate a level of mastery in the five core subjects that is pretty close 
to the minimum standard that had in the past applied to college preparatory classes. Supporting 
changes were also made in the elementary school curriculum. 
 The anticipated shift to an all Regents curriculum appears to have induced many districts 
to expand enrollment in Regents courses by students who will graduate before the graduation 
requirements kick in.  The percentage of the state’s high school students who took and passed 
Regents English (at the 65% level) rose from 42 percent in 1993 to 58 percent in 1997.  During 
that four year interval, the share taking and passing Regents exams rose from 40 to 47 percent 
in Biology, from 52 to 59 percent in Course I Mathematics and from 40 to 49 percent in U.S. 
History.  
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  While New York State has the most comprehensive system of end-of-course exams, a 
number of other states appear to be shifting toward end-of-course examinations.  North Carolina 
has had end-of-course exams since 1988-91.  California, Texas, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Tennessee and Virginia are phasing in compulsory end-of-course exams 
in key subjects.  In Maryland, Tennessee and Virginia there are plans for the EOCEs to 
eventually replace the state’s MCE.  Texas appears to be evolving its MCE system into 
MCE/end-of-course examination hybrid system.   
  What have been the effects of the standards based reforms and increased high school 
graduation standards?    Section 3 examines effects on drop out rates and high school 
graduation rates.  Section 4 examines effects on achievement in core academic subjects in 4th 
grade, 8th grade and at the end of high school.  Section 5 examines their effects on college 
attendance rates of students.  Section 6 examines effects on early labor market experiences of 
students. 
III. IMPACTS OF HIGHER STANDARDS ON DROP OUT RATES AND GRADUATION 
RATES.  
Effects of Graduation Requirements:  Theory predicts that an increase in the number 
of courses required to graduate is likely to induce some students to give up on getting a diploma 
and drop out of high school.36  Look at the situation faced students who have failed a number of 
courses and have therefore accumulated only 8 Carnegie units by the end of their sophomore 
year.  If the state requires 16 Carnegie units to graduate (as Illinois did in 1992), getting a high 
school diploma looks feasible.  If, by contrast, the state requires 23 Carnegie units to graduate 
(as Louisiana and  District of Columbia did in 1992), getting a diploma starts looking very difficult.   
Reduced enrollment rates and graduation rates are likely to result.37  Therefore: 
H1—Enrollment rates and graduation rates will be lower in states with higher Carnegie 
unit graduation requirements. 
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Effects of MCEs on Dropout Rates:  Minimum competency exams are different from 
Carnegie unit graduation requirements and, consequently, may have different effects.  In our 
view, failing an MCE test the first or second time it’s taken is only rarely going to lead the student 
to ‘give up’ and drop out.  People tend to attribute bad outcomes to external factors, bad luck and 
other temporary circumstances (I was feeling sick, the test didn’t cover the material I studied or I 
didn’t try) rather than to their innate ability.38  As a result, they are likely to be optimistic about 
their chances of passing the next time.  Only 4.3 percent of the 10th graders in New York, New 
Jersey and Ohio who were questioned after failing an MCE expressed a fear that they would not 
graduate.  Most reacted by “studying harder next year” (24%), taking summer school courses 
(29%), repeating the same course next year (24%), taking a special course the next year (9%) 
and/or getting tutoring help (30%).39  In fact, incentives to stay in school to get the diploma will 
rise if the MCE signal makes academic achievement and/or the diploma more valuable in the 
labor market.  Consequently, we will test for effects on dropout rates and enrollment rates 
without specifying a direction. 
Hypothesis 2A—Enrollment rates and dropout rates will be different at schools/in states 
with MCEs.  
Hypothesis 2B—Any negative effect of MCE’s on enrollment rates will be confined to the 
students with below average 8th grade GPA's.  
 Effects of MCEs on Graduation Rates: Conventional wisdom predicts that a minimum 
competency exam will cause graduation rates to fall.  But this too is not necessarily the case.   
Economic theory makes an unambiguous prediction of lower graduation rates only for the case 
where the rewards for getting a diploma and for effective teaching are unaffected by establishing 
a MCE.  This, however, is not likely to be the case.  Minimum competency exams improve the 
information content of the diploma signal, so the economic payoffs to getting a diploma, to 
literacy and to academic achievement are likely to increase, possibly substantially.  The publicity 
that inevitably attends the publication of school results on medium and high stakes tests will 
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make teachers and administrators more accountable for the achievement of at-risk students.  If 
the returns to greater student effort and to increased focus on teaching at-risk students do not 
diminish too rapidly, learning might improve so much that graduation rates rise when a MCE is 
established.  The policy debate, however, is dominated by concerns that higher standards will 
lower graduation rates.  Consequently, it is this hypothesis that will be tested.   Therefore:   
Hypothesis 3A---MCEs will increase the number of students who graduate more than 4 
years after completing 8th grade.  
Hypothesis 3B—A MCE graduation requirement will increase the likelihood of students 
getting a GED instead of a diploma.  Since getting a GED also involves passing a test, it 
is not clear which types of students are more likely to be induced to pursue that option by 
an MCE. 
Hypothesis 3C—MCEs will increase the number of students who have not obtained a 
diploma or GED within 6 years of completing 8th grade. 
Hypothesis 3D—Any negative effect of MCE’s on high school completion rates will be 
confined to the students with below average 8th grade GPAs.  
Previous Studies: A number of studies have examined the effect of MCEs and 
Carnegie unit graduation requirements on enrollment and graduation rates.  Dean Lillard and 
Phillip DeCicca found that enrollment rates were reduced by increases in the number of courses 
necessary to graduate but not by MCEs.  Their analyses of the National Educational Longitudinal 
Survey of 1988 (NELS-88) found that different specifications produced different estimates of their 
impact on drop out rates.  Models that controlled for state fixed effects and examined the effect 
of introducing a state MCE tended to find no effect. 40  Two independent sources of data—state 
aggregate data obtained from the Census Bureau and the National Center of Educational 
Statistics (NCES), and NELS-88—are analyzed below. 
3.1 Cross section of States 
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State level data on enrollment rates and high school graduation rates for the early 1990s 
were analyzed.  The dependent variables were the 1990 enrollment rate of 17 year olds and the 
high school graduation ratio (the ratio of the number of high school diplomas awarded in the 
state to the number of 17 year olds).41   Data on each state’s compulsory education laws and 
high school graduation requirements—minimum competency exams and the number of 
Carnegie units required to graduate--were taken from the 1993 issue of the Digest of Educational 
Statistics and by contacting accountability staff in states with ambiguous data. The control 
variables characterizing the demographic background of the state’s high school age youth were 
as follows:  
· a parents’ education index equal to the average of the percent of parents with a high 
school diploma and the percent of parents with a university degree, 
· incidence of poverty for children under 18. 
· percent population foreign born. 
· percent of public school students African American. 
· percent of public school students Hispanic. 
The other policy variables included: 
· A dummy variable for New York State (testing whether the voluntary Regents Exams 
have any impacts on dropout rates.)  
· A dummy variable for whether 17 year olds are required to be in school by the state’s 
compulsory attendance law. 
 The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. The estimated effects of 
each of the state policies are graphed in Figure 1.  The statistical significance of the coefficients 
is indicated by the number of asterisks (***s) to the right of the coefficient and above or below 
the bar. The number of courses required to graduate has significant negative relationship with 
enrollment rates.  Effects appear to be small, however.  A four unit increase in requirements 
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lowers the predicted enrollment rate by 1.2 percentage points in one regression and by .72 
percentage points in the other.  
 School attendance laws may be having an effect, but the effect seems to be small.  Point 
estimates of impact are positive but only in the model predicting enrollment rates in the 1990 
Census are they significant at the 10 percent level on a two-tail test.  
 
 
 
  None of the coefficients on the Minimum Competency Exam variable are significant at 
even the ten percent level on a one-tail test.  The point estimates for the models predicting 
enrollment rates are, contrary to conventional wisdom, positive. Clearly, there is no evidence in  
these data that the type of MCEs that existed at the beginning of the 1990s lower aggregate  
enrollment and graduation rates.  New York State’s voluntary Regents exams also have no 
significant effects on dropout rates or graduation rates.   
 Suicide rates for the 1994-1997 period collected by the Centers for Disease Control were 
also modeled as function of school policy variables.  None of the school policy variables had 
large  
or statistically significant effects on suicide rates. 
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Figure 1-- Effects of State Policies on School
Attendance and Graduation Rates
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Table 2: 
Determinants of School Enrollment and High School Graduation Rates 
 
 
 
 Percent of 17 year 
olds Enrolled in 
High School 
High Sch. 
Diplomas per 
100  17 year 
olds 
Suicides 
per 100,000  
10-19 year 
olds 
Reading 
4th Grade 
Mathematics 
4th Grade 
 1990 
Census 
1991 
NCES 
1991 NCES 1994-97 
CDC 
1994 
NAEP 
1992 NAEP 
State Minimum 
Competency Test5 
.11 
(  .81) 
.47 
(.53) 
- .50 
(2.27) 
- .51 
(  .45) 
5.37** 
(2.41 
2.62* 
(1.42) 
New York State 
 
2.08 
(1.90) 
.60 
(1.24) 
.28 
(5.35) 
- .17 
(  .07) 
8.6* 
(4.91) 
5.93+ 
(3.92) 
Number of Carnegie Units 
Required to Graduate 
-.30*** 
(.11) 
-.183** 
(.069) 
-.179 
(.297) 
.18 
(1.26) 
 
------ 
 
------ 
No Carnegie Unit Grad 
Requirement 
-5.13** 
(2.14) 
-3.46** 
(1.40) 
.70 
(6.02) 
1.32 
( .46) 
 
------ 
 
------ 
Attendance Required at age 
17 
.92 
( .52) 
.36 
(.34) 
.62 
(1.46) 
.12 
( .16) 
 
------ 
 
------ 
Parents Education Index1 .33*** 
(.105) 
.128* 
(.069) 
.759 
(.294) 
.21 
(1.59) 
.12 
( .28) 
.68*** 
(.22) 
Percent in Poverty (People 
18 years or less)   
.052 
( .076) 
-.022 
(.049) 
-.027 
(.212) 
-.014 
(  .30) 
-.38* 
( .21) 
-.35* 
(.18) 
Percent Foreign Born3 -.192** 
(.081) 
-.207*** 
(.053) 
-.463** 
(.228) 
-.35*** 
(2.79) 
-.18 
( .23) 
-.24 
(.19) 
% of Public School Students 
Black4. 
-.052* 
(.028) 
-.052*** 
(.019) 
-.158* 
(.079) 
-.045 
(1.28) 
-.46*** 
(.09) 
-.32*** 
(.05) 
%  of Public School 
Students Hispanic4 
-.044 
( .037) 
-.012 
(.024) 
-.071 
(.103) 
.075 
(1.29) 
-.34*** 
(.11) 
-.17* 
(.09) 
Adj R Squared .5047 .5528 .5322 .2463 .7262 .8414 
RMSE 1.636 1.072 4.59 2.23 4.11 3.42 
# of Observations 50 50 50 50 38 41 
Mean of Dep. Variable 88.9 84.2 76.0 6.94 213.9 217.3 
 
+   Statistically significant  at the 10% level one a one tail test      
*  Statistically significant at 5% level on a one tail test 
**   Statistically significant at 5% level on a 2 tail test   
***  Statistically significant at 1  % level on a 2 tail test 
1  Average of the percent of parents obtaining a secondary high school diploma and the percent of parents obtaining a 
university degree. Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics. 1991.  Pg. 139. 
2   Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics.  U.S. Department of Education.  1991.  
Pgs. 49, 129, 119. 
3  1990 Census of Population.  Social and Economic Characteristics U.S.  Pgs. 174-79. 
4   Digest of Education Statistics. National Center for Education Statistics.1993.  pgs . 61 & 76. 
5 Columns 1, 2 & 3 regressions use a competency exam (MCE) variable for 1991 in which Virginia =0.  The MCE96 
ariable used in column 4, 5 and 6 adds Ohio and Virginia to the MCE category.  
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3.2   NELS-88 Analysis of Drop Out Rates and Non Completion of High School  
The National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS-88), is a longitudinal data set that 
followed a nationally representative sample of 8th graders in 1988 through the year 1994. 
Questionnaires were completed by the principal of the student’s high school in both 1990 and 
1992. This questionnaire asked whether students had to pass a minimum competency 
examination to graduate from high school. The MCE variable used in this paper is the average of 
the 1990 and 1992 responses to this question.  Our estimations include controls for grade point 
average in 8th grade, 8th grade test scores in English, mathematics, science and social studies, 
whether they took remedial courses in 8th grade, whether they took advanced courses, TV and 
homework hours, reading for pleasure, an indicator for being handicapped, socio-economic 
status of the student’s family, logarithm of the number of books in the home, parent involvement 
index, family size, marital and parental status in 8th grade, locus of control index, self esteem 
index and hours working for pay during 8th grade (and it’s square), an index for smoking in 8th 
grade, dummies for race, ethnicity and religion, dummies for 3 Census regions and rural, 
suburban and urban residence and six variables describing the quality of the high school.  The 
variables describing the quality of the student’s secondary school were a dummy variable for 
Catholic school, for secular private schools and for schools formed by non Catholic religious 
organizations, average teacher salary, percent free lunch, percent students that were white, 
mean education of parents of students attending the school, mean 8th grade test scores of the 
high school’s students and average enrollment per high school grade (and it’s square).42  
Logit models were estimated in NELS-88 data predicting whether the student drops out 
at any time during high school, whether the student obtains a GED certificate and whether the 
student fails to get either a GED or a high school diploma.  Results are presented in Table 3.  
The approximate effect of Xi (at the mean of the dependent variable) on the probability of not 
completing high school or attending college can be obtained by multiplying bi times P(1-P).  Let 
us begin by examining the very large effects of 8th grade GPA and 8th grade test scores on the 
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probability of graduating. In non-MCE schools, an increase in the GPA from C+ to B+, lowers the 
probability of dropping out by 6.2 percentage points, lowers the probability of not getting a 
diploma or a GED by 4 percentage points and lowers the probability of getting a GED by 3.1 
percentage points.  Given the low incidence of these outcomes in the data set, these are large 
effects.43   
Results for the coefficient of the MCE variable and its interaction with GPA are reported in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. The major finding is that for students with average grades in 8th 
grade, the MCE graduation requirement did not have significant effects on dropping out, getting a 
GED, a delay in getting a high school diploma or failing to get either a GED or diploma.  Figure 2 
presents the pattern of results for Getting a GED. 
 
Table 3 
Effects of Minimum Competency Examinations on 
Non-Completion of High School 
[Logistic Models with linear interaction] 
 
  
P 
bar 
Min. 
Comp. 
Exam 
MCE* 
8th Gr 
GPA 
8th 
Grade 
GPA 
8th Gr 
Math 
Test 
8th Gr 
English 
Test 
8th Gr 
Science 
Test 
8th Gr 
Social 
Studies 
Test 
c2 w. 
62 DF/ 
Nobs 
Ever Dropped Out .133 .033 
(.093) 
-.078 
(.096) 
-.54*** 
(.08) 
-.32*** 
(.06) 
.024 
(.06) 
-.08 
(.05) 
-.027 
(.05) 
2817 
12,378 
Dropout in 1992  .079 .034 
(.120) 
-.079 
(.119) 
-.49*** 
(.093) 
-.31*** 
(.070) 
-.051 
(.066) 
-.090 
(.065) 
-.020 
(.060) 
1867 
12,337 
No Diploma or 
GED 
.092 .094 
(.117) 
-.301** 
(.118) 
-.48*** 
(.09) 
-.51*** 
(.07) 
-.12* 
(.07) 
-.12** 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.07) 
2337 
12,378 
Obtained Diploma 
Late 
.090 .122 
(.106) 
-.037 
(.112) 
-.73*** 
(.09) 
-.084 
(.064) 
.069 
(.061) 
.006 
(.062) 
-.006 
(.057) 
1229 
10,995 
Obtained Diploma 
Early 
.015 .090 
(.213) 
-.030 
(.233) 
.23 
(.19) 
.067 
(.132) 
.035 
(.130) 
-.229* 
(.131) 
-.008 
(.123) 
1916 
12,372 
Obtained GED .049 .113 
(.149) 
.128 
(.148) 
-.67*** 
(.11) 
.003 
(.078) 
.083 
(.074) 
.025 
(.074) 
.022 
(.079) 
644 
12,378 
 
Source: Analysis of NELS88.  Sample is the 8th graders interviewed in 1988 who were also interviewed in 1994.  All 
models contain a full set of student background variables measured in the 8th grade: family SES, Books in the home, single parent, 
parents divorced, # of siblings, ethnicity, religion, gender, handicapping condition, test scores, GPA in 8th grade, hours watching 
TV, hours doing homework, Read for fun index, smoking, dummy for in advanced courses, dummy for taking remedial courses, 
dummies for 3 Census regions, locus of control index, self esteem index and hours working for pay (plus it’s square).   The 
following characteristics of the school the student attended during 10th grade were also controlled: Catholic school, secular 
private school, private school controlled by a church other than the Catholic church, teacher salary, percent student body white, 
percent free lunch, mean 8th grade test score, mean family SES and enrollment per grade (plus it’s square).  The GPA variable 
ranges from 0 to 4. The 8th grade test scores have been normalized to have a standard deviation of 1. Models were run 
unweighted.   Numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient are standard errors.  The approximate effect of Xi (at the mean of 
the dependent variable) on the probability of not completing high school or attending college can be obtained by multiplying b i 
times P(1-P).  Thus, for “No diploma” the multiplier is .085.
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If, however, there is an unobserved school effect that is correlated with the MCE variable, 
the MCE coefficient will be biased. That is why the coefficient on the interaction variable may be 
a better test of the basic hypothesis.  As long as the unobserved school effect influences high 
ability students as much as low ability students, the coefficient on the interaction will be 
unbiased.  The GPA*MCE interaction is also not significantly different from zero for “Ever 
Dropped Out,” “Dropped out in 1992” and for “Delayed Diploma.”  The hypothesis of an MCE 
effect for C- students was also tested and here again there were no significant effects on any of 
these three outcomes.  Clearly Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B are rejected.  By contrast, 
Hypothesis 3C and 3D receive support.  For non-completion, there is a statistically significant 
negative interaction between GPA and MCE.  MCEs have a more negative effect on the high 
school completion rates of low GPA students than of high GPA students.  Non-completion rates 
are significantly higher for C- students when an MCE is present.  Figure 3 presents predicted 
non-completion rates for students with different 8th grade achievement levels by whether their 
high school has a MCE. graduation requirement.  Achievement in 8th grade is powerfully related 
to high school completion rates.  When it is low, MCEs have important effects on graduation 
rates.  We estimate that non-completion rates of C- students rise from 24.7 percent when there 
is no MCE to 32.5 percent when an MCE is present. 
 Many states have increased their graduation requirements by 3 or 4 Carnegie units over 
the last few decades. The state cross section regressions imply that these increases in 
Carnegie unit graduation requirements should have, ceteris paribus, decreased enrollment rates 
of 17 year olds by about one percentage point.  Data on trends in dropout rates are presented in 
Table 4.  Despite these policy shifts event drop out rates for African-Americans fell from 10.5 
percent in 1972-74 to 5.4 percent in 1990-92 and in 1996-98. Hispanic dropout rates fell from 
10.2 percent in 1972-74 to 7.7 percent in 1990-92 and then rose slightly to 8.5 percent in 1996-
98.   Event dropout rates also fell for whites.  Status drop out rates also declined during the 
period when MCEs were being introduced and graduation requirements were being increased.  
Clearly, if  
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tougher graduation standards do tend to increase dropout rates, their effects were 
counterbalanced by other forces that reduced dropout rates, such as growing incomes, the 
rising  
payoff to high school completion and college attendance and the introduction in 18 states of 
policies that make drivers licenses conditional on regular school attendance.44  
 The decline in dropout rates, however, does not appear to have led to increases in  
diplomas awarded.  In part this is due to students substituting GEDs for high school diplomas.   
But adding the American Council on Education’s reports of GEDs awarded to youth under age 
20 to administrative reports of diplomas awarded by public and private schools does not really 
change the conclusion.  When this sum is divided by the number of 17 year olds (column 10 of 
Table 4), this ratio is stable in the 1970s and 1980s and declines in the 1990s.45  These data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that rising graduation requirements are lowering graduation rates 
even while they leave dropout rates unchanged. 
 Table 4: Trends in Dropout Rates by Ethnicity 
 Event Dropout Rate 
Grades 10-12 
Status Dropout Rate-15-
17 yr olds 
Status Dropout Rate-18-
24 yr olds 
Diploma 
+ GED 
LT20 / 17 
yr old 
 White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic Total 
1972-74 
Avg. 
5.80 10.47 10.23 6.83 7.90 --- 14.63 25.93 38.83 77.3 
1981-83 
Avg. 
5.07 8.10 9.97 5.70 5.47 10.83 14.53 21.73 35.17 76.6 
1990-92 
Avg. 
3.87 5.40 7.73 4.27 4.90 9.47 13.30 15.67 32.87 77.8 
1996-98 
Avg. 
4.37 5.37 8.47 4.07 4.07 7.17 12.87 16.67 29.63 74.7 
 
Source: Bureau of the Census,  Current Population Reports. Tables A-3, A-4 and A-5 and Tables 104 and 107 of 
Digest of Educational Statistics: 1999.  The event dropout rate is the percent of 10-12th grade students in October of 
one year who are not enrolled in high school or graduated the following October.  The status dropout rate is the 
percent of 15-17 and 18-24 year olds in the civilian non-institutionalized population who have not graduated from 
high school and are not attending high school currently.  The 10th column is the ratio of the sum of the three-year 
average of (the number of high school diplomas awarded plus the number of GEDs awarded to people under 20 
years of age) to the number of resident 17 year olds for that year.  Changes in CPS interviewing and editing 
procedures may make data on event dropout rates in the late 1990s inconsistent with previous data. 
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IV.  Effects of Standards Based Reforms on Student Achievement 
Previous Studies:  Past studies of the effects of statewide testing tied to curriculum 
frameworks with stakes attached to school results and/or minimum competency tests for 
graduating have found positive effects on student achievement.   Lerner and New Jersey Office 
of Educational Assessment found that test scores of students increased after the introduction of 
minimum competency exams and that the increases were greatest for minority students, for 
central city students and for students in the bottom half of the test score distribution.46  Mangino 
and Babcock’s study found that test scores of low achieving students had risen the most after 
the introduction of the Texas Assessment of Basic Skills in the Austin Independent School 
District.  This was particularly true for the items assessing higher level skills.47   
Norman Fredericksen’s study is the most valuable because he had access to 
confidential data on NAEP test scores of public school students in 1978 and 1986 together with 
the location of the school they were attending.  This enabled him to classify NAEP test takers in 
1978 and 1986 by whether they lived in a state with high stakes testing, moderate stakes testing 
or no or low stakes testing in 1986.  His 1978 base year was prior to the introduction of minimum 
competency testing systems.   Student data for both 1978 and 1986 were available for 27 states.  
The “High Stakes” category was composed of states that “we judged, had not only mandated the 
use of MCTs [minimum competency tests]; they also required school officials and teachers to 
set standards in terms of MCT scores for granting diplomas and promoting students to the next 
grade.” Ten of the 27 states were considered to have a “High Stakes” testing system. The 
“Moderate Stakes” states had MCTs but “professed to use the MCTs for such purposes as 
monitoring student performance, remediation of simple faults, or coaching those students who 
badly need assistance.”  Seven states were placed in the moderate stakes category.  The 
remaining 11 states were placed in the low stakes category.  Three states had no MCTs.   None 
of the others “mandated the use of MCT scores for any specific purpose….Some states allowed 
local options regarding the use of MCTs by county, by district or by individual school.” 
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Fredericksen selected NAEP mathematics items that had been administered in both 
years and classified them into routine items (generally simple computation) and non-routine 
items (assessing higher order thinking skills).  Using a difference of differences methodology, he 
compared the 1978 to 1986 change in percent correct for high stakes states to the change in 
percent correct for low stakes states.  Since stakes applied to promotion decisions as well as to 
graduation and to schools as well as to individual students, he studied all three of the age groups 
assessed by NAEP.  He found that 1978 to 1986 gains in percent correct for routine items were 
7.9 percentage points for 9 year olds (3.1 points for 13 year olds and .6 points for 17 year olds) 
higher in high stakes states than in low stakes states.  On non-routine items the high stakes 
state advantage was 4.5 points for 9 year olds, 4.6 points for 13 year olds and 1.9 points for 17 
year olds.  With the exception of the routine items given to 17 year olds, these are very 
substantial differentials.  Except in primary school the response appears to be greater for test 
items assessing higher level skills than for simpler test questions. 48 
Now let us examine the new evidence we have assembled on the effects of the 
standards-based reform strategies discussed in Section 2.   Two different data sets were 
analyzed: (1) Cross-sections of state mean NAEP 4th and 8th grade test scores in reading, 
mathematics and science in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998 and (2) NELS-88 data on test score 
gains from 8th grade to 12th grade for individual students.  The first data set allows us to look at 
the effects of various standards based reform initiatives on the achievement of primary school 
and middle school children.    The second data set allows us to look at the effect of minimum 
competency exams on learning gains after 8th grade and to disaggregate the analysis by the 
student’s 8th grade GPA. 
4.1 Cross section of States 
The analysis of state cross-section data provides estimates of the consequences for 
statewide student achievement of six different but complementary standards based reform 
strategies:  
1. Minimum competency exams 
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2. Voluntary end-of-course exams combined with minimum competency exams—i.e. the 
New York/North Carolina stakes for students policy mix during the middle of the 1990s49 
3. School by school reporting of the results of statewide testing 
4. Rewards for schools that improve on statewide tests or exceed targets set for them 
5. Sanctions for failing schools—closure, reconstitution, loss of accreditation etc. 
6. Assistance programs for low performing schools  
The dependent variables are state level means for 4th and 8th grade NAEP tests in 1992, 
1994, 1996 and 1998 in reading, mathematics and science.  The models estimated all have 
updated versions of the same six demographic controls—the parental education index, poverty 
rate for children, percent of public school students who are African-American in 199x, percent 
who are Hispanic in 199x and percent who are Asian in 199x—as our earlier analysis of 
enrollment rates and graduation rates.50   We begin by focusing on the effects of the two policy 
options that raise the stakes for students: minimum competency exams and end-of-course 
exams.  Since only two states, New York and North Carolina, had a comprehensive system of 
end-of-course exams during this period, the EOCE variable is a dummy that equals 1 for New 
York and North Carolina and a zero otherwise.  At the beginning of the decade the Regents 
exams were voluntary and the North Carolina EOCEs had been in place for only a year or so.  
As the end of the decade approached, the New York students taking NAEP tests were facing the 
prospect of being compelled to take the Regents exams in high school and to pass five of them 
in order to graduate.   The MCE variable is a 1 for states that had or were phasing in a minimum 
competency exam graduation requirement (i.e. students are actually taking pilot tests even if 
stakes are not yet being applied) and the students taking the NAEP test were subject to the MCE 
requirement.  For regressions predicting 1996 and 1998 NAEP test scores, the MCE variable 
was set equal to 1 for Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.  Note that New York and 
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North Carolina are coded as zero on the MCE variable, so the coefficient on the EOCE variable 
measures the combined effects of an EOCE and a MCE.  
The results are presented in Table 5. The estimated effect of living in a state with a MCE  
is given in column 1.  The estimated effect of living in a state with a hybrid end-of-
course/minimum competency exam system is given in column 3.   The statistical significance of 
each coefficient is indicated by the number of asterisks (***s) to it’s right.   A single * means the 
coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at the 5 percent level on a one tail test.   A “+” 
indicates the coefficient has the predicted sign and is significant at the 10 percent level on a one 
tail test.   Coefficient standard errors appear in columns 2 and 4 and adjusted R squares in 
column 7.  Root mean square errors (RMSE), a measure of the accuracy with which the 
regression predicts actual values of the dependent variable, is found in column 8.  
The strongest results are for the New York/North Carolina policy mix, a hybrid MCE/end-
of-course exam system.  The coefficient on the EOCE indicator variable is positive, large and 
statistically significant in the models predicting reading, mathematics and science achievement 
in 1994, 1996 and 1998.  On the NAEP reading and math tests a grade level equivalent (GLE) is 
about 11.5 points.  Thus going to school in New York or North Carolina is estimated to raise 4th 
grade math achievement by three-quarters of a grade level equivalent and 4th and 8th grade 
reading achievement by roughly two-thirds of a GLE.  Science and mathematics achievement of 
8th graders is roughly half a grade level equivalent higher.    Looking over time the effect of 
attending school in an EOCE/MCE state grew substantially.  This is what one would predict 
would occur as North Carolina teachers adjust to the introduction of EOCEs and New York 
teachers start responding to their voluntary EOCE system becoming compulsory.51   
The estimated effects of minimum competency exams are also positive but smaller.  
Eleven of the 17 MCE coefficients in the table are positive and significant at the 10 percent level 
on a one-tail test.   Our point estimates imply that 4th graders in MCE states are 30 to 40 percent 
of a GLE ahead of students in non-MCE states.  Eighth graders are 12 percent of a GLE ahead 
in reading and about 24 percent of a GLE ahead in math and science.  
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Table 5 
The Effects of Minimum Competency Exams and NYS Regents Exams on 
Reading and Mathematics Achievement in 4th and 8th Grade 
 
 Minimum Comp 
Exam 
EOCE/MCE 
New York and 
North 
Carolina 
Poverty 
& Par. 
Educ 
Af.Am, 
Hisp 
F Born 
Adj R  
Square 
RMSE # of 
Obs 
 Coef StdEr Coef StdEr      
Reading –8th Gd--
1998 
         
  Overall Average 1.39 1.76 7.74*** 2.46 x x .731 2.98 35 
  HS Dropout Parents 5.66* 3.07 8.83** 4.3 x x .217 5.21 35 
  HS Grad Parents - .47 1.97 3.6 2.76 x x .586 3.34 35 
 Some College Parents 1.45 1.93 5.71** 2.7 x x .425 3.27 35 
 College Grad Parents 1.61 2.22 8.07** 3.11 x x .601 3.77 35 
Reading-4th grade          
 Overall Avg. in 1998 3.35+ 2.24 9.9* 5.7 x x .686 4.91 39 
 Overall Avg. in 1994 4.64* 2.35 7.35** 3.17 x x .761 3.83 38 
 Overall Avg. in 1992 3.64** 1.43 4.53* 2.37 x x .874 3.04 34 
Math –8th grade--1996          
  Overall Average 2.71+ 1.78 5.56* 2.93 x x .879 3.77 40 
  HS Dropout Parents 2.55 2.13 5.81+ 3.5 x x .659 4.50 39 
  HS Grad Parents 1.09 2.19 5.61+ 3.59 x x .816 4.62 40 
  Some College 
Parents 
2.89+ 1.96 3.37 3.22 x x .796 4.14 40 
  College Grad Parents 2.76+ 1.74 5.16* 2.86 x x .876 3.68 40 
1996 4th grade Math 4.18** 1.88 9.7* 5.10 x x .728 4.45 43 
1992 8th grade Math 2.94* 1.53 2.67 2.83 x x .875 3.65 41 
1992 4th grade Math 3.24** 1.43 2.54 2.65 x x .842 3.42 41 
Science-8th grade-
1996 
2.51+ 1.50 5.7+ 3.9 x x .893 3.24 39 
 
***  Statistically significant at 1% level on a 2 tail test        
**   Statistically significant at 5% level on a 2 tail test 
*  Statistically significant at 5% level on a 1 tail test 
+  Statistically significant at 10% level on a 1 tail test 
 
Source: Authors analysis of NCES data from state NAEP studies in 1998, 1996, 1994 and 1992, The Reading Report Card and the Mathematics Report 
Card.  A one grade level equivalent (GLE) test score differential is about 11 .5 points on both the reading and mathematics tests.  In all models New York 
State and  North Carolina were coded as EOCE/MCE and Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia were coded as a 1 on the MCE variable.   Ohio was introducing an MCE during this period so it 
was coded as a zero when 1992 test scores were predicted and as a 1 when 1996 and 1998 test scores were predicted.  All of the regressions 
controlled for the following demographic characteristics of the state’s students: the incidence of poverty for children under 18 (averaged from 1990 to 
the date of the dependent variable), the percent of population foreign born, the percent of 199x public school students African American, the percent of 
199x public school students Hispanic, the percent of 199x public school students Asian and a parents education index. The Education Index was 
defined as the average of the percent of parents with a secondary high school diploma and the percent of parents with a 4 year college degree.  
Hawaii was not included in the analysis because we could not control for the effects of Pacific Islander ethnicity. The majority of Hawaiian students are 
Pacific Islanders and these students do significantly less well on NAEP tests than local Whites and Asians.  RMSE stands for root mean square error or 
alternatively the standard error of the estimate. 
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MCE effects appear to be larger and more significant for 4th graders than for 8th graders.  
This pattern of larger effects for younger students suggests that the MCE variable may be 
proxying for other correlated features of the policy environment.  And indeed SBR policies do 
tend to cluster.  Table 6 presents a matrix of the correlations among our five SBR policy 
indicators. States that have MCE exams tend to also have well developed school report card 
systems.  They are also more likely to reward schools that have improved significantly or 
exceeded achievement targets, to provide assistance to schools that are failing and to sanction 
failing schools that do not improve. Fifteen of the 16 states with MCEs either reward successful 
schools or sanction failing schools. Nine of the MCE states do both.  Those nine states are: 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee and Texas.  Only 6 of the 34 non-MCE states do both. Nineteen of the non-MCE 
states have not adopted any of the school oriented SBR initiatives except for school report 
cards.  These states tend to be small, middle class and largely white.  Their students tend to 
score above the national average on nationally  
 
Table 6 
Correlations between State Standards-Based Reform Strategies 
 Minimum 
Competency 
Exam 
School 
Report 
Cards 
Rewards 
for 
Successful 
Schools 
Penaltie
s for 
Failing 
Schools 
Assistance 
for Failing 
Schools 
Rewards 
+ 
Penalties 
Index 
Minimum Competency 
Exam in 1996 
1.00 .271 .448 411 .316 .554 
School Report Cards .300 1.00 .442 .356 .575 414 
Rewards for Successful 
schools 
.333 .278 1.00 .205 .169 .668 
Penalties for Failing 
schools 
.544 .457 .429 1.00 .709 .839 
Assistance for low 
performing schools 
--- --- --- --- 1.00 .605 
Rewards + Penalties 
Index 
.526 .442 .822 .867 --- 1.00 
Numbers below the diagonal are the correlations between averages of  0-1 indicator variables reported in Quality 
Counts for January 1997 and January 1998.  Numbers above the diagonal are for policy intensity variables 
constructed from the detailed description of accountability systems in the January 2000 Quality Counts.  The 
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minimum competency exam variable is a 0-1 variable that counts New York State as a MCE state.  Hawaii is 
excluded.  Information on the policies of the District of Columbia was obtained by interviewing the Washington Post 
reporters who cover DC schools. 
 
normed tests, so state politicians probably do not feel the same need to impose a state 
accountability system intended to push reluctant local school administrators to raise standards.  
Most of these states have also not felt the need to identify a group of low performing schools and 
then provide special assistance to help these schools turn themselves around.  
School focused SBR strategies tend to cluster together as well.  States that sanction 
failing schools are much more likely to have programs that assist failing schools to get better.  
States that sanction failing schools are also more likely to reward successful schools.    
 What are the impacts of school focused SBR strategies—school report cards, rewards 
for success and sanctions for failure--on student achievement?  Information on which states 
were pursuing these SBR strategies was taken from the 1997 and 1998 Quality Counts special 
issue of Education Week.   Because the information on SBR reform initiatives was only available 
for the late 1990s, we ran regressions predicting mathematics and science achievement in 1996 
and 4th and 8th grade reading achievement in 1998.  As a first step, each policy variable was 
entered alone into the standard specification in which NAEP test scores are predicted by a 
parental education index, the poverty rate, percent African-American, percent Hispanic and 
percent foreign born.      
The results are presented in Table 7.  School report cards and other public reporting 
strategies appear not to have significant or consistent effects on the NAEP test scores.  SBR 
strategies that involve rewards and consequence for schools, by contrast, do appear to have 
positive effects.  Students in states pursuing the rewards strategy are significantly better in math 
and reading in 4th grade.  Students in states pursuing the consequence strategy are significantly 
better in math and reading in 4th grade and also better in math and science in 8th grade.  Point 
estimates of the differences between states with and without these strategies tend to be less 
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than a quarter of a GLE for 8th grade achievement levels and a half a GLE for 4th grade reading 
achievement.   
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Table 7 
The Effects of Stakes for Teachers and Students on 
Reading and Mathematics Achievement in 4th and 8th Grade 
 Stakes for 
Schools & 
Teachers 
Minimum 
Comp Exam 
EOCE/MCE 
New York and 
North Carolina 
Adj R  
Square 
 
RMSE 
# of 
Obs 
 Coef StdEr Coef StdEr Coef StdEr    
 Public Reports 
Reading-1998--4th grade 2.83 3.64     .673 5.07 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade 4.92+ 2.93     .673 3.29 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .36 2.38     .689 4.76 43 
Math-1996—8th grade -2.43 2.02     .863 4.01 40 
Science-1996—8th grade -1.26 1.63     .893 3.24 40 
 Rewards 
Reading-1998--4th grade 6.21** 2.44     .724 4.66 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade 2.37 1.79     .661 3.35 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade 3.41** 1.62     .724 4.48 43 
Math-1996—8th grade 1.86 1.57     .863 4.01 40 
Science-1996—8th grade 1.16 1.26     .894 3.23 40 
 Consequences        
Reading-1998--4th grade 5.75*** 2.06     .734 4.58 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade 2.17 1.80     .657 3.37 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade 3.86** 1.61     .733 4.41 43 
Math-1996—8th grade 2.55+ 1.56     .868 3.94 40 
Science-1996—8th grade 3.07** 1.17     .910 2.97 40 
 Rewards + Consequences 
Reading-1998--4th grade 4.56*** 1.30     .762 4.33 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade 1.79+ 1.11     .671 3.30 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade 2.70*** .95     .747 4.29 43 
Math-1996—8th grade 1.76* .97     .870 3.91 40 
Science-1996—8th grade 1.68** .76     .905 3.04 40 
Reading-1998--4th grade 4.07*** 1.32 1.86 2.09 6.28* 3.34 .774 4.22 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade 1.60+ 1.00 .99 1.76 7.23*** 2.49 .748 2.94 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade 2.44** .90 3.00* 1.78 8.63*** 3.09 .789 3.93 43 
Math-1996—8th grade 1.61+ .96 2.17 1.84 5.77* 2.97 .879 3.77 40 
Science-1996—8th grade 1.52** .72 2.21+ 1.39 5.21** 2.24 .917 2.85 40 
***  Statistically significant at 1% level on a 2 tail test 
**   Statistically significant at 5% level on 2 tail test 
*  Statistically significant at 5% level on a 1 tail test 
+  Statistically significant at 10% level on a one tail test 
 
Source: Authors analysis of NCES data from the NAEP Reading, Mathematics and Science Report Cards 
in 1996 and 1998.  In the Math96 and Science96 regressions the indicators of state policy came from the January 
1997 Quality Counts published by Education Week.  Their primary source was “Bending without Breaking’ a 1996 
publication of the Education Commission of the States.   For the reading in 1998 regressions the policy indicators 
in the 1997 and 1998 Quality Counts issue were averaged.   The Reward + Consequences variable in the bottom 
two panels are the sum of the Reward dummy and the Consequences Dummy.  All of the regressions controlled 
for the following demographic characteristics of the state’s students: the incidence of poverty for children under 18 
(averaged from 1990 to 1996), the percent of 1990 population foreign born, the percent of 1996 public school 
students African American, the percent of 1996 public school students Hispanic, the percent of 1996 public school 
students Asian and a parents education index.  The Education Index was defined as the average of the percent of 
1990 parents who have a secondary high school diploma and the percent of parents who have a university degree.  
Hawaii was not included in the analysis because we could not control for the effects of Pacific Islander ethnicity.  
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About half of Hawaiian students say they are Pacific Islanders and these students do significantly less well on 
NAEP tests than local Whites and Asians.   The EOCE/MCE variable is a dummy =1 for New York and North 
Carolina. 
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When all three SBR policy indicators were entered simultaneously, the rewards and 
consequences variables continued to have positive effects, but the school report card variable 
became unstable and lost significance.  We, therefore, dropped public reporting from future 
specifications of the model.   
 The coefficients on the rewards and consequence indicators were not significantly 
different from each other, so we imposed the assumption that they are in fact equal and used a 
sum of the two variables in our preferred specifications in the fourth and fifth panels of the table.  
In these models, the rewards + consequences SBR variable is a significant predictor of all five     
test scores.  Adding indicator variables for minimum competency exams and for the EOCE/MCE  
policy mix has almost no effect on the estimated effect of school rewards and consequences on 
test scores.   
We also estimated models that freely estimated the separate effect of each policy: 
Rewards, Consequences, Minimum competency exams and Hybrid End-of-course/MCE exams. 
These results of these estimations are graphed in Figures 4 and 5.  An examination of these 
figures reveals that states that have implemented both policies--rewards for success and 
sanctions for failure--have 4th grade reading scores that are about three-quarters of a GLE 
greater than demographically similar states that have implemented neither policy and 4th grade 
math scores about 40 percent of a GLE greater.  Their 8th grade test scores are between a 
quarter and a third of a GLE greater.52 
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Do scaled measures of SBR initiatives improve our ability to predict student 
achievement?  The rewards programs, assistance programs and sanctions programs 
implemented by various states differ dramatically.  Some target many schools, others just a few.  
Some are well funded, others are not.  Some are effective, others are probably ineffective.  Why 
not construct policy intensity scales that distinguish ‘effective’ SBR programs from ‘ineffective’ 
SBR programs and then enter the intensity variables into our cross-state regressions?  The 
problem with this research strategy is that all of the people who know enough about state SBR 
initiatives to construct such scales also know which states have had the most success in 
improving student achievement.  Inevitably the numeric values they would assign to a state’s 
SBR initiative would be influenced by that knowledge.  The scales would not have been defined 
on an a priori basis and, as a result, tests of the effect of the SBR initiative scales would be 
invalid.  Our solution to this problem was (1) to assign the task of developing SBR intensity 
indexes to a member of our team who was unfamiliar with which states have raised test scores 
the most and (2) to construct the indexes by applying a formula to the published indicators of 
state SBR initiatives published in Quality Counts in January 2000.  Four indexes were created: a 
school report card index,  a rewards for improving index, a sanctions for failure index and an 
index of assistance for low performing schools index.  The results of the analysis are reported in 
Table 8.  Clearly our effort was a failure.  None of the SBR indexes we created are good 
predictors of student achievement.  Why did the simpler dummy variable specifications do so 
much better?  The dummy variables described the policy environment in 1996 and 1997; while 
the indexes characterized it in 1999.  Policies have been changing.  As a result, the correlation 
between the 1996/7 dummy variables and the 1999 indexes are not high.53  Since we were 
predicting 1996 and 1998 test scores, the dummy variables did a better job. 
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Table 8 
The Effects of Stakes for Teachers and Students on 
Reading and Mathematics Achievement in 4th and 8th Grade 
 
 Stakes for 
Schools & 
Teachers 
Minimum 
Comp Exam 
EOCE/MCE 
New York and 
North Carolina 
Adj R  
Square 
RMSE # of 
Obs 
 Coef StdEr Coef StdEr Coef StdEr    
 Public Reports Index 
Reading-1998--4th grade .53 .53     .677 5.04 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .17 .38     .641 3.44 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .38 .49     .694 4.72 43 
Math-1996—8th grade -.25 .43     .859 4.08 40 
Science-1996—8th grade -.36 .34     .894 3.21 40 
 Rewards Index 
Reading-1998--4th grade -.20 1.35     .667 5.12 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .35 .92     .641 3.45 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade 1.74+ 1.12     .709 4.60 43 
Math-1996—8th grade .90 1.07     .860 4.06 40 
Science-1996—8th grade .68 .85     .893 3.24 40 
 Sanctions Index 
Reading-1998--4th grade .79+ .50     .692 4.92 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .54+ .34     .670 3.30 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .54 .44     .702 4.66 43 
Math-1996—8th grade .04 .40     .857 4.10 40 
Science-1996—8th grade -.19 .32     .892 3.25 40 
 Help Failing Schools Index 
Reading-1998--4th grade .48 .41     .681 5.01 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .43+ .28     .668 3.31 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .67 .79     .695 4.71 43 
Math-1996—8th grade .39 .73     .858 4.08 40 
Science-1996—8th grade .00 .59     .891 3.27 40 
 Reward + Sanctions 
Reading-1998--4th grade .48 .41     .681 5.01 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .43 .28     .668 3.31 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .68* .34     .721 4.51 43 
Math-1996—8th grade .19 .32     .858 4.08 40 
Science-1996—8th grade .00 .26     .891 3.27 40 
          
Reading-1998--4th grade .12 .44 3.51+ 2.40 7.43* 4.17 .700 4.86 39 
Reading-1998—8th grade .15 .29 1.06 1.92 6.93** 2.88 .714 3.07 35 
Math- 1996---4th grade .32 .36 3.50* 2.02 7.67** 3.60 .747 4.29 43 
Math-1996—8th grade -.10 .34 2.95+ 1.97 6.16* 3.34 .868 3.94 40 
Science-1996—8th grade -.31 .26 3.31** 1.49 6.34** 2.52 .909 2.98 40 
 
***  Statistically significant at 1% level on a 2 tail test        
**   Statistically significant at 5% level on 2 tail test 
* Statistically significant at 5% level on a 1 tail test   
+  Statistically significant at 10% level on a one tail test 
 
Source: Authors analysis of NCES data from the NAEP Reading, Mathematics and Science Report Cards 
in 1996 and 1998.  Indicators of state policy were taken from the January 1999 Quality Counts published by 
Education Week.   The Reward + Sanctions variable in the bottom two panels are the Sanctions Index plus 2 times 
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the Reward Index.  All of the regressions controlled for the following demographic characteristics of the state’s 
students: a parents’ education index, an  updated child poverty, % African American, % Hispanic and % Asian.   
Estimated Effects of EOCEs and MCEs when models include indicators of School-
Based SBR initiatives: Adding the school rewards and consequences variable to the models 
containing EOCE and MCE variables leaves the coefficient on the end-of-course/MCE strategy 
variable, the New York state dummy, essentially unchanged.  We conclude, therefore that our 
earlier finding that the New York/North Carolina student stakes policy mix has a large effect on 
achievement is not changed by including controls for other SBR initiatives.  
Adding the school rewards and consequences variable does reduce our estimates of the 
backwash effects of minimum competency exams on achievement in 4th and 8th grades.  The 
biggest change is in the model predicting 4th grade reading achievement where the estimated 
effect falls by one-half.  The estimated effects of MCEs on math and science achievement in 8th 
grade are reduced by only about 20 percent.  Point estimates imply that when other SBR policies 
are held constant, that 8th grade students in MCE states are about 20 percent of a GLE ahead of 
comparable students in non MCE states in math and science and about 10 percent of a GLE 
ahead in reading.  If this were to be the only effect that MCEs had, most advocates for the policy 
would probably be disappointed.  But we have not yet looked at the effect of MCEs on learning 
during the high school years.   One would expect the effects of MCEs to be greatest on students 
who are approaching graduation.  We now turn to an analysis of exactly that issue. 
4.2 Analysis of Longitudinal Data on Test Score Gains during High School 
Models were estimated predicting test score gains for English, mathematics, science 
and social studies and for the average of the four tests in NELS-88 data. We used the Thetas 
produced by the IRT model because they have the normal distribution called for by the statistical 
program, SAS’s Proc Mixed, we are using to estimate our models. Separate models were 
estimated for the difference between 10th grade and 8th grade test scores, the difference 
between 12th grade and 10th grade test sores and for the gain over the full 4 year period from 
1988 to 1992.   Students who dropped out of high school were given the tests along with those 
who remained in school.  In order to prevent the measurement error in the test scores from 
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biasing the results, the lagged value of the test whose gain score is being predicted never 
appeared on the right hand side of the regression.54  When the gains on individual tests were 
being predicted, however, the student’s scores on the other three 8th grade tests were included 
as control variables.  The student’s GPA in 8th grade was also one of the control variables in all 
models.   
Results:  We expect MCE’s to have most of their impact on high school students who 
are at risk of failing them.  This is why two variables were included in each model to measure the 
effects of minimum competency exams: a dummy variable for high schools with a MCE 
graduation requirement and an interaction between the MCE dummy variable and the student’s 
8th grade GPA.  The interaction variable was defined as MCE*(GPA-2.93).  By deviating GPA 
from it’s mean of 2.93 before constructing the interaction variable, the coefficient on the MCE 
dummy variable becomes an estimate of the impact of MCEs on students who have a B/B- 
averages in 8th grade.  The coefficient on the MCE dummy can be found in the third column of 
Table 9.  It is hypothesized to be positive and indeed it is in 11 of the 15 estimated models.  It is, 
however, positive and significant at the 10 percent level in only 3 of the models. Most importantly 
it is not significant in the model predicting gains in the test composite.  Point estimates suggest 
that MCE’s may have larger effects on learning gains between 10th and 12th grade than the gains 
between 8th and 10th grade.   
If, however, there is an unobserved school effect that is correlated with the MCE variable, 
the MCE coefficient will be biased.   That is why the coefficient on the interaction variable may be 
a better test of the basic hypothesis.  As long as the unobserved school effect influences high 
ability students as much as low ability students, the coefficient on the interaction will be 
unbiased. The interaction variable tests the hypothesis that MCEs have more positive effects on 
the learning of low GPA students than of high GPA students. It can be found in column 5 of Table 
3.  It is hypothesized to be negative and indeed all 15 coefficients are negative and 8 of them are 
significantly negative at a 10 percent level on a one tail test.  Most importantly it is significantly 
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negative in the models predicting gains in the composite test scores.  Our estimates of the effect 
of MCEs on test score gains of C- and A students are given in columns 6 and 7 of Table 9.  
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Table 9 
Effect of Minimum Competency Examinations on  
Test Score Gains by 8th Grade GPA 
 Grade 
Span 
Minimu
m 
Comp. 
Exam 
MCE 
Std 
Error 
MCE* 
8th 
Grade 
GPA 
Inter
act 
Std 
Error 
Effect 
on C- 
Stud. 
Effec
t on A 
Stud. 
-2 
times 
Res. 
Log 
Likeli-
hood 
Mean 
of 
Dep.  
Var. 
Gain 
Scores 
         
 Test 
Average 
8-12 .102 (.161) -.252* (.150) .42+ -.17 55752 7.43 
 10-12 .157 (.144) -.225* (.124) .44* -.08 50151 3.53 
 8-10 .013 (.137) -.183+ (.113) .24 -.18 63601 4.15 
            
Science 
Test 
8-12 .421* (.234) -.272 (.227) .76 .13 63557 7.20 
 10-12 .533** (.211) -.289+ (.213) .90** .22 57949 2.67 
 8-10 .070 (.217) -.169 (.200) .28 -.11 74831 4.60 
          
Math Test 8-12 .090 (.191) -.216+ (.167) .36 -.14 57983 8.49 
 10-12 .029 (.132) -.354*** (.134) .48** -.35* 49687 3.26 
 8-10 .194+ (.146) -.010 (.132) .21 .18 65819 5.33 
          
 Social 
Studies 
8-12 .093 (.265) -.335+ (.236) .51 -.27 62497 9.38 
 10-12 .187 (.267) -.154 (.215) .38 .02 56956 5.87 
 8-10 -.116 (.233) -.356* (.194) .33 -.50* 73339 3.46 
          
English 
Test 
8-12 -.171 (.221) -.185 (.224) .06 -.37 63023 5.94 
 10-12 -.084 (.222) -.139 (.201) .09 -.23 57980 2.42 
 8-10 -.016 (.188) -.215 (.171) .26 -.25 72271 3.65 
 
Source: Analysis of NELS-88.  Sample is the 8 th graders interviewed in 1988 who were also interviewed in 
1994.  The dependent variables are the difference between a student’s  thetas (derived from the IRT scaling 
model) for grade t and her theta for  grade t-2 or t-4..  In 8 th grade cross section data, the standard deviation of the 
Thetas is approximately 8.5 for all four of the tests.  All models contain a full set of student background variables 
measured in the 8 th grade: family SES, Books in the home, single parent, parents divorced, # of siblings, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, handicapping condition, test scores in the three other subjects [not the one for which the gain 
score is calculated], GPA in 8 th grade, hours watching TV, hours doing homework, Read for fun index, smoking, 
dummy for in advanced courses, dummy for in remedial courses, dummies for 3 Census regions, locus of control 
index, self esteem index and hours working for pay (plus it’s square).  The following characteristics of the school 
the student attended during 10th grade were also controlled: Catholic School, secular private school, private school 
controlled by a church other than the Catholic church, teacher salary, percent high school student body white, 
percent free lunch, mean 8 th grade test score of the students in the respondent’s high school, mean family SES 
and enrollment per grade (plus it’s square).  Teacher pupil ratio was not included because it was often missing 
and its coefficient was never significant and typically of the wrong sign in the specifications that included it.  There 
are no controls for 8 th grade test scores in the model predicting average test score gains.  The models were 
estimated by SAS Proc Mixed assuming random school effects.  Numbers in parenthesis to the right of the 
coefficient are robust standard errors that are corrected for multi -stage sampling. 
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Table 10 
Effects of Minimum Competency Examinations on 
College Attendance 
[Logistic Models] 
 Mean 
of 
Dep. 
Var. 
Min. 
Comp. 
Exam 
MCE* 
8th Gr 
GPA 
8th 
Grade 
GPA 
8th Gr 
Math 
Test 
8th Gr 
English 
Test 
8th Gr 
Science 
Test 
Social 
Stud 
Test 
c2 w. 
52 DF/ 
# Obs 
          
1st Semester .563 .002 
(.060) 
-.035 
(.073) 
.730*** 
(.056) 
.307**
* 
(.04) 
.082** 
(.038) 
.05 
(.04) 
.12*** 
(04) 
4472 
12,276 
2nd Semester .563 -.020 
(.061) 
-.075 
(.075) 
.744*** 
(.059) 
.31*** 
(.04) 
.05 
(.04) 
.03 
(.04) 
.12*** 
(.04) 
4333 
12,276 
3rd Semester .547 .102* 
(.060) 
-.121* 
(.076) 
.758*** 
(.057) 
.28*** 
(.04) 
.09** 
(.04) 
.02 
(.04) 
.13*** 
(.04) 
4498 
12,281 
4th Semester .528 .098* 
(.060) 
-.178** 
(.075) 
.749*** 
(.057) 
.27*** 
(.04) 
.07** 
(.04) 
.016 
(.04) 
.16*** 
(.04) 
4501 
12,273 
 
Source: Analysis of NELS88.  Sample is the 8 th graders interviewed in 1988 who were also interviewed in 
1994.  All models contain a full set of student background variables measured in the 8 th grade: family SES, Books 
in the home, single parent, parents divorced, # of siblings, ethnicity, religion, gender, handicapping condition, test 
scores, GPA in 8 th grade, hours watching TV, hours doing homework, Read for fun index, smoking, dummy for in 
advanced courses, dummy for in remedial courses, dummies for 3 Census regions, locus of control index, self 
esteem index and hours working for pay (plus it’s square).   The following characteristics of the school the student 
attended during 10th grade were also controlled: Catholic school, secular private school, private school controlled 
by a church other than the Catholic church, teacher salary, percent student body white, percent free lunch, mean 8 th 
grade test score, mean family SES and enrollment per grade (plus it’s square). There are no controls for whether 
the student dropped out of high school so non-graduates are a zero on the dependent variable.   Models were run 
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unweighted.  Numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient are standard errors.  The approximate effect of Xi (at 
the mean of the dependent variable) on the probability of not completing high school or attending college can be 
obtained by multiplying b i times P(1-P).  Thus, for “Attending college in the 4
th semester” the multiplier is .246. 
How big are MCE induced gains in test scores from 10th to 12th grade?  It depends on the 
student’s GPA in 8th grade.  A calculation of the effects is presented in Figure 6.  For C- students 
the effect was about 24 percent of a grade level equivalent (GLE) on the test score composite, 
50 percent of a GLE in science, 23 percent of a GLE in mathematics, 16 percent of a GLE in 
social 
studies and 6 percent of a GLE in English.55   For B/B- students the effect was 8 percent of a 
GLE for the composite, 30 percent of a GLE in science, 1 percent of a GLE in math, 8 percent of 
a GLE in social studies and -6 percent of a GLE in English.  For A students the point estimate of 
the effect is –4 percent of a GLE in the composite, 12 percent of a GLE in science, -16 percent 
of a GLE in math, 1 percent for social studies and –15 percent of a GLE in English.  These 
results make a strong case that MCEs induce schools to focus more on teaching struggling 
students.  However, this emphasis may result in the students with A averages in 8th grade 
learning less.  This may be one reason why the grassroots opposition to MCEs appears to come 
mainly from good students in upper middle class school districts.  Additionally, our point 
estimates of the MCE effect on C- students in 8th grade is not as impressive as one would like, 
and the estimated effect of MCEs on B/B- students is essentially zero.56  
  What were the other statistically significant determinants of 8th to 12th grade learning as 
measured by the four subject composite?  During the 4 year interval, males learned .45 of a 
grade level equivalent more than females, Asians learned .48 GLEs more than whites, African-
Americans learned .49 GLEs less than whites, students not living with a parent learned .47 GLEs 
less, and students living in the North Central and Southern regions learned .16 to .24 GLEs less 
than students in the Northeast and students in non-public high schools learned a non significant 
.18 GLEs more.   Learning gains were also greater for students from high SES families, for 
students high on the read for fun index and high on the internal locus of control index, for 
students who watched a great deal of TV in 8th grade and when parent involvement was high.  
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Learning gains were greater at high schools serving high SES students and at high schools 
where entering students had low 8th grade test scores.  
V. The Effects of Minimum Competency Exam Graduation Requirements on College 
Enrollment Rates 
If MCEs raise academic achievement, as intended, they are likely to increase the 
proportion of high school graduates who attend and complete college. Opponents of MCEs 
concede this point but argue that it is accomplished by reducing the number of high school 
graduates not by increasing the numbers attending and completing college.  They predict that 
the reductions in high school graduation rates they expect MCEs to cause will in turn lower the 
proportion of 8th graders who eventually attend college.  Proponents of MCEs disagree.  They 
argue that MCE tests assess very basic skills and that students who cannot, after many tries, 
pass such tests are not prepared for college level work.  Open door institutions will admit them, 
yes, but they will need extensive remedial course work and are unlikely to complete any course 
of study.  It is better, they argue, for high schools to hold all students to higher standards and to 
tell poorly prepared students of their deficiencies early enough for something to be done about it.  
Students will then take learning more seriously and fewer will find they lack the skills and 
knowledge necessary to succeed and thrive in college.  They predict that, even if MCEs reduce 
the number of high school graduates, the proportion of 8th graders who enroll in college five 
years later will not decline.  Indeed, drop out rates during the first years of college should be 
reduced and so a larger proportion of 8th graders will be in college 6 years later in 1993/94 (the 
sophomore year of college for students who graduate on schedule and enter college the 
following September).  
If as hypothesized above, the effects of MCEs on learning are larger for students who 
were in the bottom half of the class in 8th grade, the impacts of MCEs on college attendance 
rates will have a similar pattern.  
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Hypothesis 4A--Minimum Competency Examinations will increase college enrollment 
rates.  Impacts should be larger on sophomore year enrollment rates than freshman year 
enrollment rates. 
Hypothesis 4B—Minimum competency exams will substantially raise college enrollment 
of students who had below average 8th grade test scores and GPA.  Students with high 
test scores and high GPAs in 8th grade will be unaffected by MCEs.  
 5.1 Results using NELS-88 data 
 Analyzing HSB data, Bishop and Mane found that high school graduates coming from 
high schools with an MCE graduation requirement [as reported by the principal] had significant 
positive effects on the probability of being in college during the four-year period immediately 
following high school graduation.57  See Table 10.  Effects were largest for students in the 
middle and bottom of the test score distribution and tended to be greater in the 2nd and 3rd years 
out than in the 1st, 4th and subsequent years out.  This study, however, has an important 
limitation: only high school graduates were studied.  This means that if MCEs lowered the high 
school graduation rate, they could increase the proportion of high school graduates going to 
college without increasing the total number of students going to college. 
 We will avoid this problem by analyzing longitudinal data on a sample of 8th graders.  We 
assess the effects of MCEs on the college attendance rates from 1992 to 1994 of students who 
were in 8th grade in 1988.  Logistic regressions were estimated predicting college enrollment in 
the fall of 1992, spring of 1993, fall of 1993 and the spring of 1994.  The results presented in 
Table 10 and Figure 7 support hypotheses 4A and 4B. The estimated effect of MCEs on 
enrollment of B/B- students was significantly positive in the second academic year after high 
school graduation. As predicted, the effect of MCEs on the probability of attending college grew 
with time out of high school rising from zero in the 1992/93 academic year 1992/93 to 2.5 
percentage points in the 1993/94 academic year.   
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 Consistent with Hypothesis 4B, MCEs have a larger effect on the college attendance of 
students with low GPAs in 8th grade. The interaction variable was significantly negative in the  
models predicting college attendance in fall 1993 and spring 1994. For C- students the MCE 
increased college attendance rates by about 1 percentage point in the 1992/93 academic year, 
by 4.5 percentage points in the fall of 1993 and by 5.4 points in the spring of 1994. These are 
very   substantial effects.  Figure 4 presents the college attendance rates predicted by the model 
for Spring 1994.   
 With respect to the control variables, few of the findings are surprising.  Students with the 
highest college enrollment rate were from small, intact, high SES families, Asians or African-
American rather than white, a Catholic or Jewish religion rather than Protestant, no religion or no 
response, high on the internal locus of control index, non-smokers who did not read for fun much 
but spent many hours doing homework in 8th grade, and attended a small high school or a 
Catholic high school. 
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VI. The Effects of Minimum Competency Exam Graduation Requirements on Wages and 
Employment After High School 
MCE’s are hypothesized to improve job opportunities in three ways.  First, by improving 
student achievement they raise worker productivity.58  Even when this does not immediately 
raise workers’ earnings, the effect of academic achievement on wages grows with time and 
eventually becomes very large59. 
The second way MCEs improve job opportunities is by sending a signal to employers that 
“ALL the graduates of this high school meet or exceed your hiring standards.”  The fact that they 
have passed the MCE is the proof.  In most communities, competencies developed in the local 
high school are poorly signaled to employers. The lack of signals of achievement in high school 
tends to make employers with the best jobs reluctant to risk hiring recent high school graduates.  
Indeed they often carry in their head very negative stereotypes regarding recent high school 
graduates.  A black personnel director interviewed for a CBS special on educational reform 
proudly stated, "We don't hire high school graduates any more, we need skilled workers."60  
They prefer, instead, to hire workers with many years of work experience because the 
applicant's work record serves as a signal of competence and reliability that helps them identify 
the most qualified.  
Establishing a minimum competency exam, therefore, is one way a school district or 
state education system can try to overcome this signaling problem and help it’s graduates get 
good jobs.  The existence of the minimum competency exam graduation requirement should be 
well known to local employers.  With the MCE requirement, the school’s diploma now signals 
more than just seat time; it signals meeting or exceeding certain minimum standards in reading, 
writing, mathematics, science and social studies as well.  Because of pooling, all high school 
graduates should benefit from a MCE regime, not just the students with low achievement levels 
in 8th grade.  
The third way that MCEs can affect job opportunities is by improving the quality of the 
information that employers have on the academic achievement of recent high school graduates.  
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If employers become more able to assess the academic achievement of job applicants, they will 
give these traits greater weight in the selection decisions and rewards for academic 
achievement will rise. MCEs will significantly improve signals of achievement if MCE test scores 
(or the grade level at which the student passes the MCE) are included on the high school 
transcript or if employers use the MCE pass rates reported on school report cards as a 
handicapping factor for evaluating grade point averages from different schools.  
The foregoing logic generates a number of testable predictions regarding the graduates 
of high schools with a MCE graduation requirement.  Holding constant socio-economic status 
(SES), 8th grade test scores, 8th grade GPA, working during 8th grade, attitudes in 8th grade, 
whether the individual gets a diploma or a GED, current and past college attendance and a 
complete set of other individual and school characteristics:  
Hypothesis 5A---Students at MCE high schools will obtain higher wage rates and higher 
earnings than students at schools without MCE graduation requirements. 
Hypothesis 5B---The rewards for academic achievement will be greater in states and school 
districts with minimum competency examinations.  
6.1 Results using NELS-88 data 
 Analyzing High School and Beyond data and controlling for college attendance and a host 
of other variables, Bishop, Moriarty and Mane (1998) found that females graduating from high 
schools with a minimum competency exam graduation requirement [student report] earned 
more than women graduating from schools without an MCE.  Concern about the accuracy of 
student reports of the existence of a MCE at their high school led Bishop and Mane (1999) to 
reanalyze HSB data using principal reports of the existence of a MCE graduation requirement. 
They found even larger effects. Principal reports of a MCE graduation requirement had positive 
effects (significant in some but not all years) on wage rates of male and female graduates and 
on the earnings of graduates four and five years after graduation. The wage rate effects of 
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MCE’s appeared to be larger for students in the bottom three quarters of the test score 
distribution. 
 Here we analyze data from NELS-88.  Models were estimated predicting five indicators of 
early labor market outcomes: earnings in calendar 1993, average monthly earnings when 
working, monthly earnings in January/February 1994, the hourly wage rate and the total number 
of months worked in the 21 month period following high school graduation.  The models 
predicting these labor market outcomes were generally the same as those used to predict high 
school completion and college attendance. The first exception to that generalization was the 
inclusion of controls for high school completion: dummies for “Ever dropped out,” “Obtained a 
GED,” “Failed to get either a diploma or a GED,” “graduated early and, for late graduates, “the 
length of the delay in graduation.”  The second exception was the inclusion of controls for current 
and past college attendance: a dummy variable for full-time college attendance during the period 
for which earnings is measured, a dummy for part time attendance during that period and the 
number of semesters of college attendance prior to the earnings measurement period.    
 Table 11 presents our analysis of the effects of minimum competency examination 
graduation requirements on earnings and employment using the same interaction specification 
used for predicting high school completion and college attendance. Consistent with Hypothesis 
5A, minimum competency examinations had a consistently positive effect on earnings for 
students with average grades. The MCE coefficient was positive in all four of the models 
predicting wage rates and earnings and significant in two. Students with average grades from 
high schools with MCEs earned 8 percent more during calendar 1993 and, conditional on having 
worked during the month, they earned about 8.6 percent more than students graduating from 
high schools without MCEs.  Going to a high school with a MCE was, by contrast, not associated 
with more months of employment. 
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Table 11 
 
The Effect of Minimum Competency Exams on Employment Outcomes after High School 
[8th Grade GPA Interactions] 
 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Min 
Comp 
Exam 
MCE* 
8th Gr 
GPA 
Effect on 
A 
Student 
Effect 
on C- 
Student 
No 
Diploma 
 
Obtain 
GED 
8th Gr 
GPA 
Adj 
R Sq 
OLS 
 1993  Annual 
Earnings  
$5225 
(5696) 
432*** 
(139) 
321** 
(162) 
775*** 
(191) 
28 
(276) 
-2113*** 
( 318) 
53 
( 426) 
-331*** 
( 127) 
.2117 
When 
Working 
         
 Average 
Earnings/mo 
$ 512 
($526) 
44.1*** 
(11.8) 
9.8 
(13.2) 
54.6*** 
(16.0) 
31.8+ 
(22.7) 
-138*** 
( 26) 
38 
(  37) 
-2.8 
(10.7) 
.2052 
1994 
Earnings /mo 
$ 495 
($670) 
25.8* 
(15.1) 
24.5+ 
(13.9) 
52.0** 
(20.7) 
-5.1 
(29.7) 
-132*** 
( 32) 
26.6 
(47.9) 
-11.1 
(13.7) 
.2069 
Log Hourly 
Wage Rate 
1.272 
(.569) 
.021+ 
(.015) 
.026+ 
(.016) 
.048** 
(.021) 
-.011 
(.026) 
-.088*** 
(.029) 
.027 
(.037) 
-.015 
(.012) 
.0917 
Total Months 
Worked 
13.66 
(7.72) 
.185 
(.200) 
-.056 
(.199) 
.124 
(.291) 
.256 
(.321) 
-2.75*** 
( .36) 
- .37 
( .43) 
.12 
( .15) 
.1396 
 
Source: Analysis of NELS88.  Sample is the 8th graders interviewed in 1988 who were also interviewed in 1994.  Models 
reported in this table contain controls for whether the respondent was in college full time during spring 1994, Whether 
respondent was a part-time student in spring 1994, the number of months spent attending college full-time and months spent 
attending part-time and when the student completed high school.   Models also contain a full set of student background variables 
measured in the 8th grade: family SES, Books in the home, single parent, parents divorced, # of siblings, ethnicity, religion, gender, 
handicapping condition, test scores, GPA in 8th grade, hours watching TV, hours doing homework, Read for fun index, smoking, 
dummy for in advanced courses, dummy for in remedial courses, dummies for 3 Census regions, locus of control index, self 
esteem index and hours working for pay (plus it’s square).  The following characteristics of the school the student attended 
during 10th grade were also controlled: Catholic School, secular private school, private school controlled by a church other than 
the Catholic church, teacher salary, percent student body white, percent free lunch, mean 8th grade test score, mean family SES 
and enrollment per grade (plus it’s square).  The Random effects model was estimated in SAS’s Proc Mixed without weighting the 
observations..  Numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient are robust standard errors that are corrected for multi-stage 
sampling. 
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 Column 3 of the Tables 11 presents a test of hypothesis 5B. It receives considerable  
support. All four coefficients on the GPA*MCE interaction in the earnings and wage regressions 
are positive and three are significantly positive at the 10 percent level on a one tail test.  The 
model’s estimate of the impact of MCEs on A students is in column 4.  Effects on C- students 
are in column 5.  Results are also graphed in Figures 8, 9 and 10.  For students with A averages 
in 8th    
grade, those who attended a high school with a MCE graduation requirement were paid 4.8 
percent extra per hour, earned $54.60 (about 10.6 percent) more per month and about 15 
percent more during 1993.  All of these estimates are significantly greater than zero.  
 These are striking findings. The effects are quite large and appear to have grown since 
1981. Our (1999) analysis of the effects of MCEs on the 1981-82 labor market outcomes of 1980 
graduates found no effects on annual earnings and statistically insignificant effects (of about 1.6 
percent) on wage rates. By contrast, the regressions presented above predicting the 1993-94 
labor market outcomes get much larger MCE effects particularly for monthly and annual 
earnings. In addition the pattern of MCE effects by student grades and test scores  
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changed dramatically. In 1981-82 MCEs were associated with a 2.5 percent higher wage for low 
test score graduates, a 2.0 percent higher wage for middle test score graduates and only a 0.5 
percent higher wage for high test score graduates. In 1994, by contrast, the linear interaction 
specification produces the following estimates of MCE effects on wage rates: –1.1 percent for 
those with C- GPAs in 8th grade, +2.1 percent for those with average grades and +4.8 percent 
for those with A GPAs in 8th grade.    
 Why did the impact of MCEs grow? Why did MCEs have a much more positive 
impact on high GPA students than low GPA students in 1993-94 but not in 1981-82.   Four 
explanations come to mind.  First, in 1981-82 most state level MCE graduation requirements 
were very new and employers had probably not fully adapted their hiring policies to the 
innovation.  Secondly, during the 1980s employers began to recognize that jobs were becoming 
more cognitively complex and started to give cognitive skills more emphasis in hiring.  The payoff 
to years of schooling and test scores rose61 and a rising premium for graduating from an MCE 
high school may be part of the same phenomenon. Thirdly, the legal environment shifted. 
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 The Wards Cove decision of the Supreme Court shifted the burden of proof in cases 
challenging employer use of basic skills tests that have adverse impact on minorities and this 
may have lowered the perceived legal risk of taking high school records into account when 
making hiring decisions. Finally, starting in 1989, the American Federation of Teachers and a 
number of blue ribbon panels began urging employers to reward achievement in high school.62 
Employers in jurisdictions with MCEs were apparently more responsive to these urgings. The 
reward for reading and math achievement in high school has apparently risen more in 
communities with MCE graduation requirements than in communities without such 
requirements. 
 Turning briefly to the effects of other variables, not getting a high school diploma or a 
GED lowered hourly earnings by 8.8 percent and monthly earnings (conditional on working 
during the month) by 27 percent. If the GED was obtained on the same date, wages and monthly 
earnings and total earnings in 1993 were the same as for high school graduates.  Those with 
neither a diploma or a GED earned 40 percent less.   
 At high schools without MCE graduation requirements, test scores and GPA have small 
non-significant negative effects on wage rates and monthly earnings.  At MCE high schools, 
however, higher GPAs are associated with slightly higher wages and monthly earnings.  GPA 
and test scores have significant negative effects on annual earnings for graduates from schools 
without an MCE but essentially zero effects when there is an MCE.  Students who have 1 SD 
higher test scores and one point higher 8th grade GPA earned 4.7 percent less in 1993 when 
they attended high schools without an MCE and earned a non significant 1.4 percent more when 
they attended MCE high schools.63        
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 Now let us summarize our findings on the effects of educational reforms initiated and led 
by state governments.    We looked at the effects of one old style educational reform--higher 
graduation requirements—and five standard-based reforms—school report cards, rewards for 
school improvement, sanctions for failing schools, minimum competency examinations and end-
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of-course examinations.  For minimum competency exams, effects on eight outcomes-- 
enrollment rates, high school graduation rates, suicide rates, test scores, college attendance 
rates, employment, wage rates and earnings—were studied using two very different data sets.  
For school-based SBR policies, only test scores were studied.  For end-of-course exams, 
enrollment rates and graduation rates were studied as well.  Our results are summarized in 
Table 12.  For test score outcomes the figures in the table are in grade level equivalents.  A 
number in the table that does not have *’s or a + to it’s right is not significantly different from 
zero.  The other numbers in the table are percentage increases or decreases in the outcome 
labeled in column 1. Note that the table reports the percentage increases or decreases in 
enrollment and graduation rates not the percentage change in the dropout rate. 
 Caveats:  The large number of empty cells with a ‘---‘ display our current ignorance and 
lay out an agenda for future research.  In future research we plan to try to fill in some of Table 
12’s empty cells. 
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Table 12 
Effects of Standard-Based Reform Initiatives on Enrollment Rates, Graduation Rates, 
Test Scores, College Attendance and Labor  Market Success 
 Carnegie 
Unit 
Grad. 
Require-
ments 
Minimu
m Comp. 
Exam 
End-of-
Course 
 & MCEs 
CBEEES 
School 
Report 
Cards 
Sanction 
Failing 
Schools 
 
Reward 
School 
Success 
Assist 
Failing 
Schools 
Analysis- State Cross Sections        
Enrollment at age 17 Neg** 0 0 --- --- --- --- 
High School Graduation  ns 0 0 --- --- --- --- 
Suicide Rate 10-19 yr olds 0 0 0 --- --- --- --- 
4th grade Reading-1998  t=0 .16 .55* 0 .35*** .35*** 0 
8th grade Reading-1998  t=0 .09 .63*** 0 .14* .14* 0 
4th grade Math-1996    t=0 .26* .75*** 0 .21** .21** --- 
8th grade Math-1996  t=0 .19 .50* 0 .14+ .14+ --- 
8th grade Science-1996  t=0 .21+ .50** 0 .14** .14** --- 
Longitudinal for 8th Graders in 1988        
Test Gain 10 to12th--GPA B/B- --- .08 --- --- --- --- --- 
Test Gain 10 to12th--GPA is C- --- .24* --- --- --- --- --- 
Test Gain 10 to12th--GPA is A --- - .04 --- --- --- --- --- 
Enrollment 12th Gd--GPA B/B- --- 0.2 % --- --- --- --- --- 
Enrollment 12thGd--GPA is C- --- - 0.6 % --- --- --- --- --- 
Get Diploma/GED--GPA  B/B- --- - 0.9 % --- --- --- --- --- 
Get Diploma/GED--GPA is C- --- -10%*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Attend College 1994:GPA B/B- --- 4.5 %* --- --- --- --- --- 
Attend College 1994:GPA is C- --- 23 %*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Attend College 1994:GPA is A --- - 1.6 % --- --- --- --- --- 
        
Earnings in 1993: GPA is B/B- --- 8 %*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Earnings in 1993:   GPA is A --- 15 %*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Earnings in 1993:   GPA is C- --- 1 % --- --- --- --- --- 
Avg. Earnings/mo: GPA is B/B- --- 8 %*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Avg. Earnings/mo:  GPA is A --- 9 %*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Avg. Earnings/mo:   GPA is C- --- 6 %+ --- --- --- --- --- 
Hourly Wage Rate: GPA is B/B- --- 2.1%+ --- --- --- --- --- 
Hourly Wage Rate:  GPA is A --- 4.8%** --- --- --- --- --- 
Hourly Wage Rate:   GPA is C- --- -1.1 % --- --- --- --- --- 
# of Months Employed--93-94  1 %      
 
+   Statistically significant  at the 10% level one a one tail test 
*  Statistically significant at 5% level on a one tail test 
**   Statistically significant at 5% level on a two tail test 
***  Statistically significant at 1 % level on a two tail test 
-----  means data were not available for testing this hypothesis 
t=0  indicates the relationship was assumed to be zero a priority 
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SBR policies tend to cluster.  This means that unbiased estimates of the effect of a 
particular SBR initiative are possible only when the presence or absence of other initiatives is 
taken into account.  Our analysis of the state cross sections of NAEP test scores handles this 
problem by controlling for other SBR policies.  The number of students tested is also quite large 
and one can repeat the analysis for different subjects and for different years.  These features of 
the state cross-section analysis probably make it our best estimate of the overall effects of 
individual SBR policies.   
 Impacts of SBR Policies on Test Scores:  The policy that clearly has the biggest effects 
on test scores is the Hybrid End-of-Course/Minimum Competency Exam System that has been 
in place in New York State since the early 1980s and in North Carolina since about 1990.  This 
confirms and extends earlier findings that New York State did significantly better on SAT tests 
and the 1992 8th grade NAEP math tests than other states with demographically similar 
populations.64 This policy package is also often referred to as a Curriculum-Based External Exit 
Exam System.  Most countries have such systems and studies have found that young people 
living in provinces and countries with such systems have higher reading, math and science 
achievement than students in jurisdictions that lack curriculum-based exit exams.65 
The next most powerful intervention appears to be stakes for teachers and schools 
particularly when rewards for successful schools are combined with sanctions for failing 
schools. Public reporting is necessary for the implementation of these other policies but on its 
own it has no discernable effect on student achievement.  
MCEs also have modest effects on average levels of achievement.  They do, however, 
clearly have desirable distributional consequences for they focus their incentive effects on the 
school’s struggling or lagging students.  When they are combined with stakes for teachers and 
schools, as they typically are, the package has very respectable effects on test scores.  
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Impacts of Graduation Requirements and Minimum Competency Exams on School 
Enrollment and Graduation Rates:  Increases in the number of courses required to graduate  
significantly reduce school enrollment rates but have no effect on the number of students getting 
a high school diploma or GED.  By contrast, the minimum competency exam graduation 
requirements that were in place in the early 1990s did not increase overall drop out rates or 
significantly lower overall high school completion rates as some had feared.  When, however, 
we analyzed longitudinal data that controlled for the grades and test scores of students in 8th 
grade, we found that students at MCE schools with C- grades in 8th grade, while not more likely 
to drop out, were about 10 percent less likely to get a high school diploma or a GED within 6 
years. MCEs had no significant effect on graduation rates of students with A averages or B/B- 
averages.66  
Effect of Minimum Competency Exams on Post High School Outcomes:  MCEs have 
significantly raised the college attendance rates and earnings of 18-19 year olds.  The students 
with B- and C- averages in 8th grade were significantly more likely to be attending college 2 years 
after the scheduled date of their high school graduation.  Students with B/B- averages who 
attended schools with MCE graduation requirements were paid 2.1 percent more per hour after 
graduating and A students were paid 4.8 percent extra. Students with B/B- averages in 8th grade 
earned about 8 percent more per month and per year than students who attended schools 
without MCEs.  The earnings benefits of graduating from a MCE high school were larger for the 
people graduating in 1992 than in 1980. Students with average or above average grades in 8th 
grade got higher wage jobs and earned more per month after high school only when their school 
had a MCE graduation requirement.  MCEs have not only induced employers to pay typical 
graduates more, they have apparently induced them to increase the reward they offer for higher 
achievement in high school.   
 Thus the benefits of MCEs are a rise in the immediate economic payoff to learning, 
increased time spent in schooling, lower college drop out rates and higher wage rates and 
earnings immediately after leaving high school. The college attendance effects were 
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concentrated on students with average and below average grades in 8th grade.  The wage rate 
and earnings effects  were larger for students with average and above average grades in 8th 
grade, but they were positive for C students as well.  These very substantial benefits were not 
costless, however. While the overall high school graduation rate did not change, students with 
low GPAs in 8th grade had significantly lower graduation rates when they faced a MCE.  Since 
their college attendance rates rose significantly, it is not clear that low GPA students were made 
worse off by the MCE graduation requirement.  By contrast, students with average or above 
average grades in 8th grade were definitely made better off, often very substantially.  
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